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In the last 10 years, China’s defense capability has increasingly become the focus of 
military analysts as well as a driving factor in U.S. policy. This thesis asks the question 
“How much of Chinese military modernization counts as innovation?”  In answering this 
question it defines innovation, creates a standard for identifying innovation, and applies 
this standard to the PLAN and PLAAF. 
Historically, technological innovation is either overlooked or ignored by 
intelligence services and recent developments by China have come as a surprise to many. 
This thesis identifies a total of 79 instances of innovative technology fielded by the 
PLAN and the PLAAF since 1970. Many of these innovations, like the DF-21D, PL-12, 
and recent JY series of radars, comprise weapon systems not yet developed by other 
nations and thus count as global-level innovations. China is focused on developing 
innovative technologies to exploit weaknesses inherent in other technologically superior 
forces such as those fielded by the United States in order to gain an asymmetric 
advantage in what Chinese strategists label a counter-RMA. 
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A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION AND FINDINGS 
Currently, China is in the process of significantly modernizing its military forces. 
Analysts disagree over whether this modernization will bring China’s military 
capabilities to the level of first-tier nations, and at the center of this debate is China’s 
capacity for innovation.1 Tai Ming Cheung voices a belief held by many scholars that, 
“China’s present approach appears to be the selective targeting of a few critical areas for 
accelerated development while the rest of the defense economy pursues a more moderate 
pace of transformation.”2  
Despite this focus on China’s military modernization, there has not been a 
significant effort to analyze the innovative military equipment resulting from PLA 
modernization. The focus on innovative military equipment is where this thesis adds to 
the current body of work. This thesis defines military equipment as the hardware that 
comes out of the innovation process; the innovation process itself will be discussed in 
Chapter II. The primary question this thesis seeks to answer is: “How much of Chinese 
military modernization counts as innovation?” In order to answer this question, this thesis 
first adopts the following definition of military innovation: new ways of generating 
military power, which attempt to increase effectiveness by changing the manner in which 
a military functions in the field, to enhance a country’s ability to fight wars. Second, it 
focuses on technological developments in military hardware as the basis for analysis. 
Third, it develops a standard for determining what counts as innovation, and applies that 
standard to the PLA in order to assess the results of China’s military modernization 
programs. In this way, this thesis seeks to identify technological innovation in each 
                                                 
1 Tai Ming Cheung, Forging China’s Military Might: A New Framework for Assessing Innovation 
(Baltimore, MD: JHU Press, 2014); Klaus Brockhoff and Jiancheng Guan, “Innovation via New Ventures 
as a Conversion Strategy for the Chinese Defense Industry,” R&D Management 26, no. 1 (1996): 49–56; 
Wang Yuan, “Evolution and System Characteristics of China’s Science, Technology, and Innovation 
Policies,” SITC Policy Brief 2013, no. 2 (2013); Tai Ming Cheung, “The Chinese Defense Economy’s Long 
March from Imitation to Innovation,” The Journal of Strategic Studies 34, no. 3 (2011): 325–54. 
2 Tai Ming Cheung, “The J-20 Fighter Aircraft and the State of China’s Defense Science, Technology, 
and Innovation Potential,” Policy Brief 17 (2011): 4, http://igcc.ucsd.edu/assets/001/500865.pdf. 
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branch of the PLA to determine what percentage of their equipment modernization 
qualifies as product innovation. 
The main findings of this thesis are that China is increasingly focused on fielding 
world-class technologies. It is now ranked third in terms of total military firepower 
behind only the United States and Russia.3 It has developed equipment that rivals that of 
the top militaries and in some cases, such as the DF-21D and YJ-12 exceeds them in 
performance.4 As China continues to innovate in relation to its past capabilities, it is 
beginning to develop technology that counts as innovation on the global scale: DF-21D, 
PL-12, JY-26, JY-27A, and JY-50. Despite these advances, this thesis assesses that there 
are still areas where China has not yet been able to catch up, primarily nuclear submarine 
quieting, jet engine production, and aircraft carrier technology. 
In cases where it has not caught up, China has innovated in areas that provide an 
asymmetric advantage. Examples of this are the expansive anti-ship missile programs 
specifically designed to counter U.S. nuclear aircraft carriers (CVN) and stealth-detecting 
radar designed to defeat U.S. 5th-generation aircraft.5 Further, the combination of its 
technological developments and its security situation both in Asia and with the United 
States is causing the PLA to undergo a period of doctrinal change. Instead of merely 
focusing on developing a limited number of highly capable platforms, weapons, and 
systems, China is following a dual-track of modernization whereby it is developing and 
fielding these advanced technologies of its own, but is also producing systems that allow 
its current force structure to be much more capable in a future conflict. This is best seen 
as a direct counter to the U.S. doctrine of overwhelming force through technological 
                                                 
3 “2014 World Military Powers,” Global Fire Power, April 3, 2014, 
http://www.globalfirepower.com/countries-listing.asp. 
4 Andrew Erickson and Gabe Collins, “China Deploys World’s First Long-Range, Land-Based 
‘Carrier Killer’: DF-21D Anti-Ship Ballistic Missile (ASBM) Reaches ‘Initial Operational Capability’ 
(IOC),” China SignPost, no. 14 (December 26, 2010), http://www.andrewerickson.com/2010/12/china-
deploys-world’s-first-long-range-land-based-“carrier-killer”-df-21d-anti-ship-ballistic-missile-asbm-
reaches-“initial-operational-capability”-ioc/; Dennis M. Gormley, Andrew S. Erickson, and Jingdong Yuan, 
A Low-Visibility Force Multiplier: Assessing China’s Cruise Missile Ambitions (Washington, DC: National 
Defense University, 2014), 
http://oai.dtic.mil/oai/oai?verb=getRecord&metadataPrefix=html&identifier=ADA602350. 
5 “JY-26 – China’s New Counter Stealth Radar | Defense Update:,” November 11, 2014, 
http://defense-update.com/20141111_jy-26-chinas-new-counter-stealth-radar.html#.VHYgP4tN3vE. 
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superiority; China’s counter-revolution in military affairs can best be described as 
numerical superiority combined with advanced technology.6  
China’s strategy, military modernization, and rhetoric all align in what appears to 
be a deterrent doctrine against any outside intervention in Asia. In terms of numerical 
strength, the PLAN has already surpassed the U.S. Navy in total number of combatants, 
and in each ship class with the exception of nuclear submarines and aircraft carriers.7 
While China is working to close this gap, it is simultaneously fielding equipment 
designed to neutralize these extremely expensive and vulnerable platforms.8 This thesis 
asserts that China’s modernization programs have yielded sufficiently innovative 
technology that it already possesses the ability to deter armed U.S. intervention in Asia 
due to the destructive potential it can inflict on U.S. forces. 
This thesis identifies a combined total of 79 instances of technological innovation 
in the PLAN and PLAAF since 1970. Of those 79 instances, half occurred in the last 15 
years, while nearly one-fifth (15) took place in the last five years, including all of China’s 
globally significant innovations. Several of the most significant technologies fulfill 
multiple categories of innovation: nuclear submarine propulsion, AIP, DF-21D, YJ-12, 
PL-21, JY-50, and KG-300G. Additionally, some innovations only fulfill one or two 
increase categories but still constitute significant capabilities: multiplex data link, YJ-18, 
PL-12, JY-26 and JY-27A. The DF-21D, YJ-12, PL-12, JY-26, JY-27A, and JY-50 all 
constitute global level innovations as they incorporate technological capabilities not seen 
anywhere else.  
Chinese modernization has been based on what it calls counter-RMA. This 
involves finding efficient methods to take advantage of the technological gap between 
                                                 
6 James Mulvenon and David Finkelstein, China’s Revolution in Doctrinal Affairs: Emerging Trends 
in the Operational Art of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (Alexandria, VA: The CNA Corporation, 
2005), 314–15. 
7 James R. Holmes, “China’s Navy Is Already Challenging the US in Asia,” The Diplomat, October 
16, 2014, http://thediplomat.com/2014/10/chinas-navy-is-already-challenging-the-us-in-asia/.  
8 Bill Gertz, “China Military Buildup Shifts Balance of Power in Asia in Beijing’s Favor: 
Congressional Report Warns the Danger of U.S.-China Conflict Is Rising,” The Washington Free Beacon, 
October 13, 2014, http://freebeacon.com/national-security/china-military-buildup-shifts-balance-of-power-
in-asia-in-beijings-favor/. 
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China and potential adversaries to turn enemy strengths into weaknesses. This has 
primarily been accomplished through innovations in both weapons and the systems that 
support them.9 In parallel with its counter-RMA, China is also focused on overall 
modernization of its forces and does not accept its current technological capabilities as a 
limiting factor.   
B. IMPORTANCE 
It is nearly impossible to pick up a newspaper, browse a media outlet, or read a 
professional journal today without encountering some article on the rise of China and the 
challenges it brings for the United States and for Asia. Current U.S. military doctrine is 
based on military strength gained through technological superiority; thus China’s 
capacity for military innovation is a key concern in maintaining this advantage.10 This 
doctrine assumes two things: the first is that staying ahead in innovation is essential to 
maintaining military dominance and second is that other nations will not be able to 
challenge or counter the U.S. technology advantage. In the words of Dombrowski, “The 
United States needs to aggressively innovate just to maintain its international position in 
the face of technological globalization.”11 Robert Paarlberg asserts that applied more 
broadly, military dominance comes from the ability to innovate technology.12 If China is 
in fact innovating in its defense modernization, then it can leverage this to challenge U.S. 
military superiority or counter it through targeted, asymmetric advantages. Chinese 
military leaders have themselves acknowledged that this is an essential element of PLA 
strategy.13 If this is the case, then the United States must alter its doctrine to prepare for a 
world in which its technology no longer provides a substantial military advantage. 
                                                 
9 Andrew Scobell, David Lai, and Roy Kamphausen, Chinese Lessons from Other Peoples’ Wars 
(Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 2011), 14, 
http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/PUB1090.pdf. 
10 Paul Johnston, “Doctrine Is Not Enough: The Effect of Doctrine on the Behavior of Armies,” 
Parameters 30, no. 3 (2000): 33. 
11 Peter J. Dombrowski and Eugene Gholz, Buying Military Transformation: Technological 
Innovation and the Defense Industry (New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 2006), 137. 
12 Robert L. Paarlberg, “Knowledge as Power: Science, Military Dominance, and US Security,” 
International Security 29, no. 1 (2004): 122. 
13Thomas J. Christensen, “Posing Problems without Catching up: China’s Rise and Challenges for US 
Security Policy,” International Security 25, no. 4 (2001): 9. 
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For the period beginning after WWII and continuing through today, many 
analysts use the United States as the standard against which military technology and 
innovation capability are measured.14 This association happens primarily for two reasons. 
First, since WWII, the United States has been the major source of innovation in military 
affairs with technology such as the atomic bomb, GPS guided munitions, and stealth to 
name a few. Second, the United States is currently the global hegemon, meaning that it is 
de facto measure of superior technology, providing the yardstick against which militaries 
are measured.  
Using the United States as the standard for military innovation is flawed for three 
reasons, however. First, using the United States as the standard sets an unrealistic 
baseline for innovation, and comparisons against the United States do not account for 
individual circumstances.15 At the end of WWII, the United States was arguably the most 
advanced nation in the world; it possessed a strong economy, vast natural resources, a 
growing population, and the only industrial base not devastated by the war.16 It had a 
significant head start on every other country in this regard. For example, if comparisons 
to the United States were all that mattered, the launch of China’s first successful satellite 
occurred 12 years too late to be considered groundbreaking. When viewed objectively as 
the product of a national innovation program, however, the launch of Dong Fang Hong I 
was no less innovative than the launch of Explorer I.  
Because of this disparity, there is a distinction between what counts as innovation 
for this thesis and how others consider innovation in a global context; for innovation to 
be recognized in the global context, it must be compared to all technologies fielded by all 
countries. For this thesis, analysis will focus on country-level innovation—that is, 
                                                 
14Bates Gill and Lonnie Henley, China and the Revolution in Military Affairs. (Carlisle Barracks, PA: 
Strategic Studies Institute, May 1996), 4–5, 
http://oai.dtic.mil/oai/oai?verb=getRecord&metadataPrefix=html&identifier=ADA311483.Ibid.; Michael 
Beckley, “China’s Century? Why America’s Edge Will Endure,” International Security 36, no. 3 (2011): 
70; Michael C. Horowitz, The Diffusion of Military Power: Causes and Consequences for International 
Politics (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2010), 4. 
15 Peter Cowhey, “The Third Wave: Innovation and Strategic Military Capacity in the Future,” SITC-
NWC Policy Briefs 2013, no. 9 (2013): 1, http://escholarship.org/uc/item/5s5173w8.pdf. 
16 Benjamin A. Taylor, “Military Innovation in the Rise and Fall of Great Powers: Lessons for 
America” (Master’s Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2011), 91–92, http://hdl.handle.net/10945/5616. 
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innovation with a country’s past and current capabilities as the important referents. The 
reasons for this are discussed below.  
Country-level innovation proves useful for analysis because historical examples 
show that a nation may build its innovation potential without breaking out on the global 
forum, and therefore may be ignored by intelligence analysts. This view is supported by 
Grissom’s research that shows how, in many cases, military intelligence had significant 
information describing innovations of other countries but discounted it due to views that 
were constrained by context and cultural bias.17 Because these analysts only focused on 
global innovation, they dismissed country-level innovations and the context they provide 
for innovative capacity, and subsequently refused to believe that certain nations could 
produce globally significant technological advances. One example of this is the U.S. 
intelligence service’s response to Japan’s innovations in aircraft and torpedo technology 
prior to 1945.18  
Second, just because the United States is currently the leader in innovating 
technologies, does not mean this will continue to be the case, and there is no guarantee 
that it will be the nation to develop the next revolutionary technology. Many nations and 
empires fell from great power status when their rivals successfully innovated.19 There is 
already analysis suggesting that the U.S. military is currently suffering from structural 
problems making it less likely to innovate great military advantages in the future.20 
Additionally, some scholars such as Cowen argue that the United States gained its 
advantage through the mobilization of resources that constituted “low hanging fruit,” and 
that this early advantage has run its course.21  
                                                 
17 Adam Grissom, “The Future of Military Innovation Studies,” The Journal of Strategic Studies 29, 
no. 5 (2006): 919. 
18Thomas G. Mahnken, Uncovering Ways of War: US Intelligence and Foreign Military Innovation, 
1918-1941 (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2002), 4. 
19Taylor, “Military Innovation in the Rise and Fall of Great Powers,” ix.  
20 Ibid., 108. 
21 Tyler Cowen, The Great Stagnation: How America Ate All the Low-Hanging Fruit of Modern 
History, Got Sick, and Will (eventually) Feel Better, eSpecial (London: Penguin, 2011). 
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Third, as Beckley summarizes in his research, military technological superiority 
alone is not the determining factor in war, nor is numerical superiority; rather the winning 
nation benefits from a combination of resources, technology, and efficiency.22 In 
subsequent research, Beckley describes how nations use their resources and efficiency to 
create the necessary innovation in order to sustain this cycle.23 China does not necessarily 
need to invent technology that is superior to that of the United States.24 In fact, part of 
China’s current strategy is to leverage its current equipment in order to take advantage of 
its technology gap with the United States in what it deems a counter-revolution in 
military affairs.25 China only has to develop technology advanced enough to leverage its 
vast resources into an advantage, which China can then use to sustain its own cycle, 
similar to the methods undertaken by the United States during its rise.26  
Answering the question, “How much of China’s military modernization counts as 
innovation?” allows for an objective analysis of China, in order to judge its true 
capabilities. This will show how effective innovation programs have been within the PLA 
and project likely trends for the future. Only after we stop making comparisons to the 
United States and set a standard to determine whether a technology counts as innovation, 
can further comparisons be drawn between different nations.  
The ability for China to innovate, even if only in relation to its past ability, 
provides indications for innovative capacity and potential for future innovation in the 
global context. If the global context were all that mattered, then analysis would ignore 
nations who close the innovation gap with competitors, or which innovate sufficiently to 
create an asymmetric advantage. Further, if analysis only focuses on innovation on the 
global scale, then it can miss important indicators of innovation potential until the 
military balance has already shifted, often with disastrous results. If Chinese innovation is 
in fact successful as evidenced by the results of PLA modernization efforts, then U.S. 
                                                 
22 Michael Beckley, “Economic Development and Military Effectiveness,” The Journal of Strategic 
Studies 33, no. 1 (2010): 44. 
23 Beckley, “China’s Century?,” 54–56. 
24 Christensen, “Posing Problems without Catching up,” 7. 
25 Ibid., 22, 27. 
26 Beckley, “China’s Century?,” 75. 
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strategy and doctrine must change if it wishes to successfully respond to a modern 
China.27 
C. LITERATURE REVIEW 
China has been the topic of a growing amount of academic literature over the past 
20 years both in general, and with more specific focus on the PLA. The study of 
innovation, and military innovation, goes back even further. The subsets of these 
categories of literature that are relevant to this thesis are divided into four themes: general 
business innovation, general military innovation, China’s military modernization, and 
China’s military innovation. Each of these groups contains sources that are useful for 
analyzing and understanding what elements of China’s military modernization consist of 
innovation. The most relevant gap where this thesis can contribute is that current studies 
of Chinese innovation lack a focused analysis of the technological outputs of China’s 
military modernization programs. In Chapter II, this thesis explores current definitions of 
innovation to determine which is most fitting for this analysis as well as develops a 
standard by which innovative military technology can be recognized.  
The oldest and broadest set of literature is focused on innovation in industry and 
business. With the vital importance of the military industrial complex, and dual use of 
industry, this body of work is essential to understanding innovation. The biggest critique 
of this literature is that most of it is written by analysts who look at innovation from a 
U.S. perspective instead of considering the context and culture of each country.28 This 
means that the general elements must be separated from those influenced by the 
comparisons to the United States. These authors argue that in order to truly judge 
innovation potential, an analytic approach needs to be taken to assess the inputs, 
processes, and resultant outputs that result in new technology.29  
                                                 
27 Christensen, “Posing Problems without Catching up,” 7. 
28 Cowhey, “The Third Wave,” 1. 
29 Tai Ming Cheung, Thomas G. Mahnken, and Andrew L. Ross, “Frameworks for Analyzing Chinese 
Defense and Military Innovation,” SITC 2011, no. Policy Brief 27 (2011): 77, 
http://escholarship.org/uc/item/5cr8j76s.pdf. 
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Another shortcoming of this literature for how it applies to China is that it is 
financially oriented, focusing on how businesses can find customers for innovative 
products and secure sources of research funding for innovation.30 Neither of these are a 
major concern in military innovation, especially as it applies to the PLA. 
Within this category there are, authors like Yuan who discuss the evolution of 
China’s S&T sector and its relationship with innovation over time.31 Yuan determines 
that China is implementing policies and coordination within its S&T sector, which is 
resulting in creative solutions, allowing innovation to occur.32 Other authors such as 
Brockhoff and Davis analyze innovation in the Chinese defense industry from a business 
standpoint, examining the evolution of drivers of innovation and the benefits of the dual 
use system.33 Dombrowski focuses on the relationship in the United States between the 
defense industry and the military to ultimately identify solutions to the political and 
financial challenges of innovation.34 All of these sources provide a useful breakdown of 
the complexities of trying to study innovation. For this thesis, the main usefulness in this 
body of work is that it includes general frameworks for assessing the products of 
innovation, as well as explains how and why China is actually promoting a serious focus 
on innovation. Despite the focus on innovation in business, these concepts and 
frameworks are applicable to the military sector as well and describe how to identify 
innovation, which will help in defining a standard for innovation. 
Within this literature, Dombrowski’s framework claims that innovation consists 
of three key phases: invention, proposal, and implementation.35 Garstka’s framework on 
innovation can be simplified into the three categories of doctrine, organization, and 
                                                 
30 Dombrowski and Gholz, Buying Military Transformation, 20. 
31 Yuan, “Evolution and System Characteristics of China’s Science, Technology, and Innovation 
Policies,” 2. 
32 Ibid., 3. 
33 Brockhoff and Guan, “Innovation via New Ventures as a Conversion Strategy for the Chinese 
Defense Industry,” 53. 
34Dombrowski and Gholz, Buying Military Transformation, 145. 
35 Ibid., 2. 
 10
technology.36 He also lays out a simplified spectrum of innovation: incremental, modular, 
radical, and architectural.37 Garstka’s work appears to be the foundation for Cheung’s 
later analysis of military innovation. This thesis accepts Dombrowski’s concept of three 
components and focuses on his implementation phase as the critical identifier of 
innovation. It then combines this with Garstka and Cheung’s framework to narrow down 
technology as the key element for analysis. 
The second category is literature that focuses on general military innovation. The 
common aim of this work is to determine how the process of innovation in the military 
occurs. Russell breaks down U.S. operations in recent wars, focusing on the processes 
involved in doctrinal innovation and notes that new doctrine tends to follow technological 
innovation.38 He concludes that during combat a lack of doctrine allows true innovation 
to occur.39 Horowitz offers insight into how innovations diffuse through a globalized 
society and develops a method of understanding and predicting the incentives that drive 
nations to respond to military innovation by adopting, copying, or countering new 
products through their own innovation.40  
This group also includes studies done on historical instances of military 
technological innovation. Rosen studies past military innovation successes which he 
breaks into three categories: peacetime, wartime, and technological.41 Rosen determines 
that historically, in the United States, military intelligence only has a very loose 
connection with technological innovation and has not been very successful at assessing 
other countries’ innovation in a manner that can drive U.S. innovation.42 While his main 
                                                 
36 John Garstka, “A Conceptual Framework for Innovation in Capability Development,” in 
Crosscutting Issues in International Transformation: Interactions and Innovations Among People, 
Organizations, Processes, and Technology (Washington, DC: National Defense University, 2009), 39–41, 
http://oai.dtic.mil/oai/oai?verb=getRecord&metadataPrefix=html&identifier=ADA512355. 
37 Ibid., 33–34. 
38 James Russell, Innovation, Transformation, and War: Counterinsurgency Operations in Anbar and 
Ninewa Provinces, Iraq, 2005-2007 (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2010), 208. 
39 Ibid., 220. 
40 Horowitz, The Diffusion of Military Power, ix. 
41 Stephen Peter Rosen, Winning the next War: Innovation and the Modern Military (Ithaca, NY: 
Cornell University Press, 1994), 7. 
42 Ibid., 253. 
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conclusions are that national innovation tends to be successful independent of funding 
and external technological threats, he also provides specific instances where an accurate 
assessment of enemy innovation allowed for the development of technological 
counters.43 Rosen’s assertion that innovation continues even in austere fiscal 
environments also proves useful when applied to instances of austere foreign assistance. 
This is seen as China continues to develop and produce innovative technologies even 
following the Sino-Soviet split, and again during its post 1989 isolation from the west.  
Barry Posen adds to this work by identifying the drivers of military innovation, 
specifically during peacetime.44 Posen also argues that innovation in military doctrine 
will be a rare occurrence, and that any definition of innovation that requires doctrinal 
change will likely discount significant advances until they are used in war.45 In his work, 
Mahnken determines that nations have difficulty identifying and assessing new and 
innovative technology being developed by others.46 Millett and Murray provide examples 
for what constitutes innovation in military technology as well as ways to categorize it.47 
This categorization will be further explained in Chapter II as the basis for the three 
increases approach utilized by this thesis. Despite their excellent analysis, neither study 
actually defines innovation. Collectively this category provides justification for 
concentrating on technological innovation and the dangers of setting the innovation bar 
so high that it discounts critical technology indicators and advances. 
The third category of literature focuses specifically on Chinese military 
modernization. Considerable study has been done on this topic, specifically by 
                                                 
43 Rosen, Winning the next War, 220, 252. 
44 Barry Posen, The Sources of Military Doctrine: France, Britain, and Germany between the World 
Wars (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1986), 46. 
45 Ibid., 55. 
46 Thomas G. Mahnken, Technology and the American Way of War (New York, NY: Columbia 
University Press, 2008), 80–84. 
47 Williamson R. Murray and Allan R. Millett, Military Innovation in the Interwar Period (Cambridge 
University Press, 1998), 557–645. 
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organizations such as RAND, the Army’s Strategic Studies Institute, and IHS Jane’s.48 
There are also authors like Cole and Cordesman who focus on the products China’s 
modernization.49 This group tends to study PLA equipment, doctrine, organization, and 
training. In the studies on equipment being utilized by the PLA the focus is on 
capabilities and quantity, rather than innovative qualities.50 
These authors also examine the reorganization of China’s defense industry over 
time, including the increase in R&D funding from both the government and private 
sectors within China.51 The analysts who study China’s military modernization tend to 
fall into two main groups. The first believe that China is rapidly acquiring highly 
advanced technology and will soon challenge the United States in military capability for 
example; Cole concludes that China will have a modern, integrated military by 2020.52  
The second group consists of authors such as Beckley, Eland, and Shambaugh, 
who believe that PLA modernization is reliant on foreign assistance and will not prove a 
challenge to the United States in the near future.53 A common theme for both groups is 
that China will likely have problems adapting organization and doctrine.54 This view, 
                                                 
48 Keith Crane et al., Modernizing China’s Military: Opportunities and Constraints (Santa Monica, 
CA: RAND Corporation, 2005), http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/MG260-1.html; Roy Kamphausen, 
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Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 2014), 
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49Bernard D. Cole, The Great Wall at Sea: China’s Navy in the Twenty-First Century (Annapolis, 
MD: Naval Institute Press, 2010), 86; Anthony H. Cordesman and Martin Kleiber, Chinese Military 
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174. 
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Policies,” 2–3; Tai Ming Cheung, Fortifying China: The Struggle to Build a Modern Defense Economy 
(Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2009), 21. 
52 Cole, The Great Wall at Sea, 202. 
53 Beckley, “China's Century?,” 77; Ivan Eland, "Is Chinese Military Modernization a Threat to the 
United States?," Policy Analysis, no. 465 (2003):12–13; David L. Shambaugh, Modernizing China's 
military: progress, problems, and prospects (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002), 282. 
54Gill and Henley, China and the Revolution in Military Affairs., 31–32; Ivan Eland, “Is Chinese 
Military Modernization a Threat to the United States?,” 2012, 6, http://object.cato.org/publications/policy-
analysis/is-chinese-military-modernization-threat-united-states; Cheung, Forging China’s Military Might, 
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however, is a shortcoming in both groups, which is shown through actual developments 
in the PLA since these works were published. Recent analysis by the DOD notes that 
PLA doctrine and tactics have evolved and adapted to U.S. capabilities, as well as 
China’s technological modernization.55 For this reason, as further laid out in Chapter II, 
this thesis will focus on the technological aspect of innovation. While this will constitute 
a lower standard of innovation than other analyses, it more accurately reflects innovation 
potential for the reasons discussed. 
The fourth category of literature examines Chinese military innovation itself, 
albeit in a broad sense. This group is primarily led by Tai Ming Cheung and has recently 
made significant efforts to break down and examine China’s periods of defense 
innovation.56 In particular Cheung has applied many of the principles from the general 
innovation literature to assess the inputs and processes of China’s defense modernization 
programs to determine that it is making organizational progress, but not yet reaping the 
outputs of a truly successful program.57  
What this body of literature lacks, however, is an analysis on the outputs of these 
programs. Cheung and Ross both admit that they have not yet applied their framework to 
China’s modernization programs, and when discussing innovation they pick specific 
examples that they have already deemed as innovative.58 Specifically there is a scarcity 
of studies on the innovative qualities of fielded equipment; this offers an area where this 
thesis can apply the hallmarks of innovation from Rosen’s work to China’s modernizing 
forces. Such a study provides insight into capabilities, measures of success, and future 
potential. 
Cheung and Cordesman have also recently produced in-depth research on the 
relationships between the Chinese state, the PLA, and the defense industrial sector in 
order to identify the drivers of modernization through organizations such as SASTIND 
                                                 
55 Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of 
China 2014 (Office of the Secretary of Defense, 2014), 12, 
http://www.defense.gov/pubs/2014_China_Report_FINAL.pdf. 
56 Cheung, “Chinese Defense Economy’s Long March,” 326. 
57 Cheung, Forging China’s Military Might, 15–18. 
58 Cheung, Mahnken, and Ross, “Frameworks for Analyzing Chinese Defense.” 
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and COSTIND.59 Their consensus is that China is developing technology in specific 
areas faster than military doctrine can keep up.60 As outlined in Chapter II, however, 
researchers have determined that this is a hallmark typical of innovative countries, and 
military doctrine adapts based on both the security situation and capabilities provided 
through technological innovations. Cheung and Cordesman discuss a few successful 
programs and conclude that China will continue to lag behind in innovation because as 
Cheung concludes, China is focused on “pockets of excellence in a landscape of 
technological mediocrity.”61 After coming to this conclusion, these analysts are now 
shifting to study the organizational aspects of China’s innovation to determine its future 
potential; rather than continuing to analyze the innovative products of current 
modernization efforts.  
There is a subset of this literature, which proposes frameworks for analyzing 
current Chinese military innovation, as well as future innovation potential. Cheung and 
Ross collaborate to propose the main framework, though they have yet to apply it to 
China.62 This framework is useful for assessing the degree and category of existing 
innovation, but does not cover how to determine when a technology actually counts as 
innovation.  
Cheung and Ross’s framework breaks innovation into a spectrum containing 
seven stages, within which to place the components of military innovation.63 This 
framework is composed of six lenses through which to view the inputs, process, and 
output of innovation: (1) the components of innovation: technology, doctrine, and 
organization; (2) the capacity to innovate: that is, innovation potential; (3) the process of 
innovation: speculation, experimentation, and implementation; (4) the degree of 
                                                 
59 Cheung, Mahnken, and Ross, “Frameworks for Analyzing Chinese Defense,” 58–61; Cheung, 
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innovation: from duplicative imitation to radical innovation; (5) the scope of innovation; 
and (6) systems of innovation.64  
Cheung uses the innovation triad from business literature, which holds that 
innovation can occur in one of three categories: Technology, Organization, and 
Doctrine.65 His framework also discusses the outputs of innovation as having seven 
different levels on spectrum: Duplicative Imitation, Creative Imitation, Creative 
Adaptation, Incremental Innovation, Architectural Innovation, Component or Modular 
Innovation, and Radical Innovation.66 The problem with this scale is that while it proves 
useful for assessing production capability, not all of the steps on Cheung’s scale fit the 
definition of innovation adopted in this thesis and in other work. Additionally the 
requirements for some of the levels are vague, blurring the transition from one to the 
next. 
The result is that currently this area of study has some broad analysis spread 
across processes, inputs, outputs, policy, strategy, and doctrine. With this disparate list of 
topics, it becomes necessary to break them down and focus on specific ones to gain the 
best granularity. Even Cheung agrees that a true assessment of innovation “requires the 
examination of a broad range of tangible and intangible science, technology, and 
innovation indicators.”67  
Despite the focus of literature on China’s modernization, however, there is little 
literature that actually assesses the success of Chinese military innovation programs 
based on their outputs: the actual hardware being produced and utilized. The current 
studies have not applied an analytic framework to military modernization programs in a 
way that can provide measures of innovation success by determining what elements 
actually count as innovation. Is China getting better at modernizing and innovating? 
What are China’s specific successes and failures?  
                                                 
64 Cheung, Mahnken, and Ross, “Frameworks for Analyzing Chinese Defense,” 77. 
65 Ibid., 78. 
66 Ibid., 79. 
67 Cheung, “J-20 Fighter Aircraft,” 5. 
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This thesis applies theories and concepts of the innovation literature to Chinese 
military modernization. It attempts to fill in the gap left by Cheung and Ross, who have 
proposed frameworks to assess where on the spectrum innovation lies, but not yet applied 
these frameworks to the PLA, nor have they determined what the baseline for innovation 
is. This standard is then applied to China’s military modernization programs across PLA 
forces responsible for power projection. This limits analysis to military forces that are the 
foundation of China’s current A2AD strategy. This thesis examines the outputs of the 
modernization programs for each relevant service and determines how much of China’s 
military modernization counts as technological innovation, in order to provide a measure 
of effectiveness. These results provide a list of technologies, which can then be plugged 
in to the existing frameworks to determine the quality of innovation taking place and 
whether that quality moves up Cheung and Ross’s spectrum over time. Additionally this 
work can then be combined with other research on the inputs and processes of Chinese 
military innovation to provide a look at the whole spectrum of the innovation chain in 
China. 
D. POTENTIAL EXPLANATIONS AND RESEARCH DESIGN 
To answer to the question of “How much of Chinese military modernization 
counts as innovation?” this thesis measures what percentage of new equipment in each 
service is innovative. In order to apply this measure, it has adopted its own standard and 
criteria for assessment. This helps in assessing how effective China is at innovating as 
well as determining whether, over time China is getting better at it.  
As explained in Chapter II, this thesis establishes the following criteria and 
standard for innovation. Military innovation provides new ways of generating military 
power by either significantly increasing effectiveness or changing military function, and 
it is intended to enhance a country’s ability to fight wars. To meet this criterion, a 
technology must provide an increase in one of three categories: efficiency, capability, or 
organization. 
Instead of defining what constitutes innovation and using that to determine how 
much innovation is occurring, many analysts typically list one or two programs as 
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examples of current innovation to base conclusions off of.68 This has led Cheung to 
conclude that China is “making steady progress in building up its innovation 
capabilities,” although he any many others believe that these are only incremental 
innovations.69 If this view is correct, then China is only able to incrementally improve its 
technologies and cannot produce global level innovations.  Additionally this view 
dismisses incremental improvements that can cumulatively result in innovation. 
An alternative view is that much of China’s military modernization is made up of 
innovative advances. These advances may not be seen as on par with products developed 
by the United States, but that does not mean they are not innovative. According to the 
seminal work of the Chinese military strategist Sun Tzu, “an Army may be likened to 
water, for just as flowing water avoids strength and strikes weakness.”70 It does not make 
sense that China would base its entire strategy on countering the technological strength of 
its rivals with similar strengths. Instead, China is focusing on creating strength through 
technology advances in specific areas where it believes it can exploit American 
weakness. This is resulting in innovations that are different from what many would 
commonly accept as global level innovations.  
Additionally in chapter six point 19, Sun Tzu claims in that, “knowing the place 
and the time of the coming battle, we may concentrate from the greatest distances in 
order to fight.”71 This is a fitting description of China’s A2AD strategy. It is obvious that 
any conflict in Asia will occur within what is commonly referred to as the second island 
chain.72 Thus if the U.S. wishes to act militarily on behalf of its Asian allies or against 
China, it must do so by projecting forces to this area. China however, need only respond 
with weapons that have the ability to strike targets within this region, and can be 
launched from within its own territory. 
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While the common belief is that China is only focusing on incremental innovation 
and is moderately efficient at it, that answer lacks sufficient justification. Any assessment 
of must be supported by an examination of the products of PLA modernization as this 
military hardware is likely leading to doctrinal changes within the PLA. This thesis finds 
that significant innovation programs support China’s growing desires for international 
prestige and widespread modernization.73  Since 1970, the PLAN and PLAAF have 
fielded 79 innovative technologies, including some that count as innovation on the global 
scale. Furthermore, these innovations are leading to adaptation in PLA doctrine as it 
seeks to better use these technologies in support of its military strategy.74  
E. THESIS ORGANIZATION 
This thesis has determined that China’s military modernization efforts have 
resulted in an increasing amount of technological innovations in the PLAN and PLAAF. 
In the past decade these innovations have resulted in several technologies that count as 
innovation on the global scale. 
This thesis begins with Chapter II describing innovation and the chosen standard 
for analyzing Chinese military innovation. It sets the groundwork for defining military 
innovation, as well as establishes which components of innovation it focuses on. It also 
examines other frameworks that have been proposed for analyzing military innovation. 
Finally it establishes the chosen framework and justification.  
Chapters III and IV are dedicated to analyzing two power projection arms of 
China’s military that are key to A2AD: PLA Naval Forces and PLA Air and Counter-Air 
Forces. Analyzing each force in its own chapter provides background on that service, 
including a timeline of equipment modernization that can be used to identify the 
progression of innovation as well as separate innovation from incremental modernization. 
It applies the developed standard to these forces in order to determine that since 1970 the 
PLAN has fielded 41 innovative technologies and the PLAAF has fielded 38.  
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Finally, Chapter V includes an overall assessment of China’s innovation progress 
and its future potential. It also offers suggestions for the direction of future, 
complementary research. Finally, it concludes with lessons and recommendations for 
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II. STANDARD OF INNOVATION 
The purpose of this chapter is to adopt a definition of innovation in order to create 
a standard, which can then be used to judge whether equipment fielded as part of the 
PLA’s modernization counts as innovation. There are several views on what defines 
innovation just as there are different frameworks for assessing it, and multiple areas in 
which it can occur. This chapter will first adopt a definition of innovation, narrow the 
focus of research to a specific phase (military technology), rely on past case studies to 
establish a standard and lay out how innovation will be identified, and finally establish 
the scope of analysis. 
This thesis holds that the concept of innovation as being global is overly narrow 
and pays insufficient attention to important country-level developments as indicators of 
global innovation potential. In missing these innovations, it sets the stage for a dangerous 
security situation in that innovative technologies may not be acknowledged until they are 
used in war. This concept is best summarized by Mahnken, “it is easy to ignore, 
overlook, dismiss, or misinterpret evidence of foreign innovation. In particular, 
preconceptions about the character and conduct of war, ethnocentrism, and incomplete 
information frequently conspire to prevent observers from understanding new ways of 
war in peacetime.”75 
A. DEFINING INNOVATION 
In order to answer its central question, this thesis takes three steps. The first is 
establishing a definition for military innovation. The second is developing a measurable 
standard that is then used to assess whether an aspect of PLA modernization counts as 
innovation. The third step is applying the definition and standard to equipment fielded by 
PLA forces that form the foundation of China’s military strategy.  
This thesis first establishes its own definition innovation and more specifically 
military innovation, as there are a myriad of definitions proposed by literature on the 
                                                 
75 Thomas G. Mahnken, “China’s Anti-Access Strategy in Historical and Theoretical Perspective,” 
Journal of Strategic Studies 34, no. 3 (June 17, 2011): 308, doi:10.1080/01402390.2011.574971. 
 22
subject. A distinction must be made between innovation and invention; this is where 
elements of business literature and military studies prove helpful. According to Garstka 
and Cheung, invention is the first occurrence of an idea for a new product whereas 
innovation is defined as the first attempt to carry it out in practice.76 Additionally, 
business literature in general defines innovation as resulting in new or improved 
technologies.77 
A distinction must also be made between innovation and incremental 
modernization. According to Murray, many modernization efforts consist of a series of 
incremental improvements, the sum of which can count as innovation, and he refers to 
this as evolutionary innovation.78 Cheung takes this idea and condenses it into a single 
stage on his innovation spectrum.79 
Cowhey describes military innovation as “the successful strategic military 
application of a technology change.”80 This leaves the question of how to adequately 
define change and how to measure success outside of victory in war. Ross’s definition of 
military innovation is more useful, but broader: “Change in the ways and means 
employed by militaries to prepare for, fight, and win wars.”81 This definition brings in the 
concepts of organization and tactics as well as equipment.  
Grissom asserts that, in order to be considered successful, military innovation 
must do three things: (1) Change the manner in which military formations function in the 
field, (2) be significant in scope and impact, and (3) be equated with greater military 
effectiveness.82 Grissom’s concept of greater military effectiveness somewhat helps to 
define Cowhey’s idea of successful, but then introduces another question, how to 
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quantify “significant,” while also implying that incremental changes do not constitute 
innovation. Horowitz agrees with most of Grissom’s elements of innovation, but counters 
that it is not important whether an innovation actually increases effectiveness and 
efficiency, it must only be intended to.83 These explanations help narrow down how 
innovation will affect a military, but often leave issues with interpretation or standards. 
For example, according to Grissom’s definition, a technology must be used in war before 
it can be determined to be innovative, hardly an effective method for peacetime planning, 
especially against a country such as China, which has not fought a war since 1979.84  
The concern with using the previous definitions lies in limiting the scope to 
technologies that are truly innovative, while still including non-revolutionary advances 
and cumulative incremental improvements. Further, the nature of modern war and 
interwar innovation means that limiting the definition to only include technology or 
doctrine tested in combat can lead to the same shortcomings exhibited by the U.S. 
military going in to WWII.85 As such, this thesis defines military innovation as new ways 
of generating military power, which attempt to increase effectiveness or change the 
manner in which a military functions in the field, to enhance a country’s ability to fight 
wars. 
This definition fits the needs of this thesis in that it acknowledges that the 
intention of innovation is to increase efficiency or effectiveness. It also does not require 
that a technology be used in war to count, instead requiring only that it be fielded or 
implemented by a military. This effectively combines elements common to the previous 
definitions in order to arrive at one that can be applied during war as well as peacetime, 
and is not limited to specific categories or roles. 
B. PHASES OF INNOVATION 
Now that this thesis has established a definition of innovation suitable for 
answering the question, it narrows the focus of research to a specific phase of innovation. 
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As explained by Dombrowski, innovation consists of three phases: conception 
(invention), proposal, and implementation.86 These elements equate to Cheung’s “process 
of innovation.”87 The majority of recent analysis on military innovation emphasizes the 
conception and proposal processes.88 This thesis focuses on the implementation phase of 
innovation, which consists of technologies and hardware produced by the innovation 
process and subsequently adopted for military use.  
Additionally, based on the previous literature reviewed, this thesis presumes that 
innovation in the implementation phase can be achieved in three possible areas: 
technology, organization, and doctrine.89 Analyzing all three components of innovation is 
a serious undertaking and beyond the scope of this thesis; as such it focuses only on the 
technological measure of innovation in PLA modernization.  
Focusing solely on technology will inevitably lower the bar for what counts as 
innovation in relation to other works in this area. The purpose of adopting this approach 
is not to overinflate China’s capabilities or the threat it poses, rather there are three main 
reasons for why the focus on technology is important. First, many scholars today consider 
doctrinal innovation the key indicator and are focusing on that aspect of China’s 
modernization; however studies have shown it is technology that actually tends to lead 
doctrinal innovation.90 This thesis’ argument that technology leads organizational 
innovation is based on Russell’s conclusion that ”military organizations show a 
propensity to develop complex structures that match the technological complexity of their 
weapons systems.”91 Russell further argues that the absence of doctrine allows militaries 
to come up with their own solutions to the environment in which they find themselves.92 
Chinese military leaders echo this sentiment in PLA education publications by stating 
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that the PLA must develop strategies to use the equipment it has already developed to 
defeat the United States, while still continuing to develop new technologies, rather than 
merely waiting to develop superior technology.93 With this in mind, an assessment of 
innovation should begin with a focus on technology, which will then provide indicators 
for potential military innovation in the other areas. 
Second, studies have shown that historically militaries do not actually follow their 
doctrine when war breaks out; instead they either fall back on their culture or innovate on 
the battlefield based on their technological capabilities and the threat.94 This means any 
analysis that focuses primarily on doctrinal or organizational innovation is inadequate as 
a true measure of innovation if it does not first consider technology. This is even more 
important in the context of Mahnken’s work, as he concludes that historically nations 
tend to either miss or dismiss the technological innovations of their potential 
adversaries.95 
Third, technology can still be innovative if it is not employed in new doctrine. 
Britain and France were the first to develop the tank, yet Germany’s doctrine for its use 
was superior.96 This doctrinal difference does not make the initial development the tank 
any less innovative. In fact if successful doctrine were the criteria for defining a 
technological innovation, then France’s early development of the tank would not be 
considered innovative at all. Its first doctrinal application was a failure, and Germany 
merely copied the technology and added its own doctrine.97 This distinction is covered by 
the definition adopted by this thesis, which accepts that the intent of a technology change 
is what matters. 
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C. CREATING A STANDARD 
Now that this thesis has accepted a definition of innovation, established which 
phase it will analyze, and determined an area of focus, the next step is to establish a 
standard to determine how much of Chinese military modernization actually counts as 
innovation. There are two primary differences between this thesis and current efforts in 
this field toward developing frameworks through which to view innovation. The first is 
that this thesis focuses on the implementation phase of innovation, which is evidenced by 
military equipment or hardware.  
The second difference is that it assesses what products actually count as 
innovation, whereas other analysts, like Cheung and Ross, are trying to analyze where on 
a spectrum certain advances fall. Their work does not define innovation and does not 
provide a standard for determining what counts. They have created frameworks for 
evaluating where advances and technologies fall without yet determining if and when 
something crosses the threshold into innovation or whether every advance should be 
placed within the spectrum and innovation determined later. Additionally they have not 
yet actually applied their framework.98 As explained in Chapter I, Cheung’s innovation 
output spectrum has seven stages: Duplicative Imitation, Creative Imitation, Creative 
Adaptation, Incremental Innovation, Architectural Innovation, Component or Modular 
Innovation, and Radical Innovation.99 
In order to determine if a technology crosses the threshold into innovation it is 
assessed based on a standard. This thesis holds that for a technology to be considered 
innovative it must fit into one or more of three primary categories. While a technology is 
only required to fit one category to count, the nature of innovation means that it is 
possible for a single technology advance to fulfill multiple categories. The three 
categories can be thought of as the three increases.  
The first category is efficiency increase: An example of this is the development of 
precision-guided munitions. This capability allowed one ton of PGMs to replace 12–20 
                                                 
98 Ross, “On Military Innovation.” 
99 Cheung, Mahnken, and Ross, “Frameworks for Analyzing Chinese Defense,” 79. 
 27
tons of unguided weapons; a significant increase in efficiency.100 The second category is 
capability increase: An example of this is the development of aircraft, which gave armies 
access to the sky as a dimension of warfare for the purposes of reconnaissance and 
weapons delivery. The third category is organizational increase, (this can be thought of as 
changing the way in which units operate): Blue Force Tracker is a great example of this 
type of innovation. Each commander and soldier now has the ability to track the exact 
battlefield position of all friendly units in real time, as well as communicate with 
individual soldiers, providing better coordination and allowing more complex 
maneuvers.101 
D. IDENTIFYING INNOVATION 
When applying its standard, this thesis uses specific functions to identify 
instances of innovation for each increase. Efficiency increases are identified by 
technological developments that result in significant improvements in areas such as 
range, speed, and accuracy. Other efficiency increases involve a significant decrease in 
the number of weapons or platforms necessary to destroy a target. For this research, an 
improvement of greater than 33% over existing equipment counts as “significant.” Other 
literature on innovation commonly discusses efficiency and other “significant” 
improvements without identifying a quantitative measure for what those actually mean. 
As such this thesis adopts 33%, however when analyzing the PLA, this thesis determined 
that most advances, which met the 33% threshold would also meet a threshold of 50% 
improvement. 
Organizational increases are identified in that they fundamentally alter the way in 
which a military interacts with its units and weapons. This is commonly seen with 
changes in coordination, communication, detection, and targeting capabilities. 
Specifically these elements see improvements in areas such as range, portability, and 
cross platform compatibility. While a 20% range increase would not meet the threshold 
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for efficiency, it may for example provide an organizational increase by allowing strikes 
beyond the detection ranges of enemy sensors. 
Capability increases are identified in that they provide new avenues for waging 
war or new methods of employing current platforms that did not exist previously. This is 
typically seen with the introduction of radical new technologies or the employment of 
existing technologies in new ways. This requires analyzing both new technologies as well 
as crossover technologies. An example of this is China’s crossover use of ballistic missile 
technology to target enemy surface ships; the DF-21D was developed from existing 
medium range ballistic missile (MRBM) designs directly modified to target aircraft 
carriers, resulting in new weapon, the anti-ship ballistic missile (ASBM). Similarly the 
CM-400AKG utilized the same core technology, but applied in a different way, which 
resulted in a scaled down ballistic missile that can be launched from light attack aircraft 
to target surface ships. Both of these weapons resulted from innovative approaches to 
anti-surface warfare by using existing technology in new ways. 
Further Mahnken, Millett and Murray all identified that innovative technology 
historically has filled one of several functions, and those functions can be used to help 
determine innovation. In order to help identify a technology as innovative it can be 
examined to see if it performs any of the following. (1) Counter critical enemy 
technology, or eliminate a critical weakness in one’s own force by providing a solution 
that offers either significant advantages or an asymmetric advantage. The development of 
the aircraft carrier to project power beyond the range of battleship fleets fits this 
function.102 (2) Provide a new form or way of war. For example, the development of 
strategic bombers is heralded by Mahnken as a “truly new approach to war waging.”103 
(3) Create a fundamental, basic change in the context in which war takes place. The radar 
based British air defense network fundamentally altered how aerial battles were 
conducted in the Second World War.104 (4) Provide alternatives to conventional ways of 
warfare. Fighting in the cyber realm allows an attacker to shut down critical systems or 
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infrastructure without the need for endangering personnel through bombing.105  
(5) Change the relationship between weapon system and operator. Systems that reduce 
operator workload and increase effectiveness such as lead computing gun sights on 
aircraft and automatic detection and tracking modes of modern radar perform this 
function.106 (6) Comprise an entirely new technology. This function is typically 
performed by radical new technologies, historical examples being the development of 
aircraft and atomic weapons.107  
This thesis adds a seventh function, that of a pure efficiency increase. This 
concept comes from business literature, which focuses on how important efficiency is 
within the realm of innovation. This concept carries over to warfare given the nature of 
human factors in warfare and costs of replacing trained soldiers. This function is 
sometimes lost in other work, because efficiency often creates such an advantage that it 
counters critical enemy technology. An example of this is the increase in range of 
missiles. While a range increase falls under the category of efficiency, it can result in 
enough of an advantage to provide a first strike capability by allowing weapons to be 
launched outside of enemy detection or weapons ranges. In this case it is considered to 
fill the function of countering critical enemy technology, rather than efficiency. 
The seven functions are a result of common themes pulled from research by 
authors such as Mahnken, Garstka, Murray and Millett into the history of military 
technological advancements and methods for identifying it.108 Many times innovative 
technologies are hard to identify. History has shown that many innovative advances are 
not acknowledged by military intelligence until they are fielded in battle, and in instances 
where they are recognized; intelligence either ignores or dismisses them. This is where 
the three increases and seven functions prove useful in identifying innovation.  
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E. SCOPE OF ANALYSIS 
In order to assess technological innovation in the PLA, a capability starting point 
must first be established, and this thesis sets this as the state of the PLA in 1970. This 
provides an ideal starting point, as prior to 1970, China relied almost exclusively on 
military equipment procured from other nations.109 After 1970, China’s indigenous 
development and modernization programs began yielding results.110 In order to augment 
domestic development, China has taken part in collaborative efforts with other nations as 
well as continuing to purchase some foreign systems. Most of these instances however, 
appear specifically designed to temporarily fill a capability gap, and have eventually been 
followed or replaced with indigenous technology.111  
Any equipment developed by China, which improves upon existing capabilities 
can then have the previously developed standard of innovation applied. This thesis 
requires new equipment be fielded operationally by a military (IOC) in order to be 
considered. This is opposed to first launch or first successful test, which are actually 
indications of invention rather than innovation. This matches the criteria previously 
established by the definition of innovation, in that equipment must actually be fielded by 
a military in order to be considered military innovation. 
There is some difficulty in separating innovation from incremental modernization, 
without losing the innovation that can often result from the accumulation of incremental 
modernization. This distinction is captured through the use of a starting point for 
analysis, which allows for the examination of capability development over time. This 
thesis tracks innovative changes from one technological advance to the next, as well as 
innovations that result from cumulative advances. It must be noted that the PLA has 
experienced both incremental modernization as well as innovation.  
An incremental modernization is the development of multiple models within a 
single platform such as the J-8 series of multi-role fighter aircraft. In total China has 
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fielded 18 variants of the J-8 since it achieved IOC in 1980, with some featuring as much 
as a 70% redesign over previous models. Overall capability increased with each 
successive model, but that increase did not always count as innovation. For example, the 
J-8B benefitted from the capabilities of three incremental advances in cockpit design, 
which when combined resulted in an entirely new relationship between the aircraft and its 
pilot. Conversely, the J-8G incorporated significant technology improvements over all 
previous models such that it counts as a single instance of innovation within this 
incremental development.112 
This thesis breaks military equipment into three categories: (1) Platforms such as 
ships, vehicles, and aircraft, (2) Weapons such as missiles and torpedoes, and (3) Systems 
such as data link and radar. This analysis is based on the principle that each platform has 
its own capabilities, as well as associated systems and weapons, while the systems and 
weapons themselves can be utilized across many platforms. Each piece of equipment is 
examined at its IOC and compared against existing PLA capabilities at that time.  
F. SOURCES 
Data for this thesis is limited to research in unclassified sources. There are 
obvious shortcomings imposed by limiting data to this medium, mainly that some 
information on the most recent PLA equipment is not openly available. This is not 
considered a significant limitation for research, however, as China is trying to sell much 
of its military equipment to other nations through venues such as international arms 
exhibitions. While sub-components and specifics of how certain systems work may be 
concealed, overall capabilities are openly professed, and it is these capabilities that this 
thesis holds to the innovation standard. Additionally, sources such as IHS Jane’s, FAS, 
and RAND are extremely reliable in the information they provide. The shortcomings of 
open source information are addressed in Gormley, Erickson, and Yuan’s study of 
China’s cruise missile program: “The most authoritative documents tend to cover general 
                                                 
112 Jane’s, “China–Air Force,” Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment–China and Northeast Asia, 




issues only; for specifics, it is often necessary to consult sources whose provenance is 
less clear.”113 They then go on to explain that when using unclassified sources such as 
Jane’s and FAS, the diversity of data points combined with years of experience and 
accurate reporting have shown reliability.114  
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III. INNOVATION IN THE PLAN 
A. OVERVIEW 
This chapter will discuss innovation in Chinese naval platforms, weapons, and 
systems. While the PLAN does operate aircraft, they will be covered in Chapter IV as 
part of air forces. There are a total of 153 PLAN modernizations examined by this thesis.  
Out of those modernizations this thesis identifies 41 instances of technological innovation 
in China’s naval forces,  of which several demonstrate particularly impressive advances 
and several others pose sharp challenges to U.S. capabilities. Since 1970, 27% of 
modernization efforts resulted in some form of innovation. The most important 
technologies identified in this chapter are the YJ-12, DF-21D, air-independent propulsion 
(AIP), nuclear submarine propulsion, and data link. While some of the more significant 
innovations meet the criteria for multiple innovation categories, others are significant 
while only filling one, an example being data link systems, which ties all of the PLAN’s 
modern weapons and platforms together in a way that has resulted in China developing 
new doctrine for carrying out its anti-access area denial (A2AD) strategy.  
For this chapter, unless otherwise cited, information on equipment capabilities 
and IOC is derived from Jane’s Online, and has been corroborated by The Naval Institute, 
The Federation of American Scientists, and Global Firepower Online. Other sources 
referenced include SinoDefense.com, IISS, and CRS reports. This chapter first reviews 
the definition of innovation, provides a brief history of the PLAN, and then discusses 
instances of innovation broken down by decade starting with 1970. 
China has a unique program for naval development in that when implementing 
new technologies, the PLA will sometimes produce as few as two platforms in a new 
class before moving on to the next technology change. CRS reports from 2008 and 2014 
suggest that this ensures that the PLAN can focus on fielding the most advanced fleet 
possible, and “a key purpose of at least some of these classes may have been to serve as 
stepping stones in a plan to modernize the PLA Navy’s surface combatant technology 
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incrementally before committing to larger-scale series production.”115 Cole agrees with 
this assessment, arguing it “speaks to a willingness to incorporate developments as they 
emerge.”116 
Initially, the focus of modernization was to produce cheap, low visibility weapons 
such as torpedoes and mines. More recently, this focus has extended to China’s anti-ship 
missile (ASM) programs. Development has not been limited to these weapons however, 
as the PLAN has benefitted from innovations in modern platforms, and more importantly 
a significant output of interconnected systems. Saunders aptly claims that this has 
resulted in the potential for China’s “system of systems” ability to rival that of the United 
States’.117  
B. INNOVATION 
From Chapter II, this thesis defines military innovation as new ways of generating 
military power, which attempt to increase effectiveness or change the manner in which a 
military functions in the field, to enhance a country’s ability to fight wars. It is worth 
stating again that this definition focuses purely on technology innovation, and only in 
reference to China’s own past capabilities. This standard is lower than what other 
analysts might use and will likely result in more technologies being considered 
innovative. As stated in Chapter II, the purpose of adopting this approach is not to inflate 
China’s accomplishments or the threat it poses, but to establish an indication of the 
progress that it is making in order to judge future potential. 
According to the definition adopted by this thesis, organizational increases 
fundamentally alter the way in which a military interacts with its own units or the enemy 
as commonly seen with changes in coordination, communication, detection, and targeting 
                                                 
115 Ronald O’Rourke, China Naval Modernization: Implications for U.S. Navy Capabilities—
Background and Issues for Congress, CRS Report for Congress, (February 4, 2008), 21; O’Rourke, China 
Naval Modernization: Implications for U.S. Navy Capabilities—Background and Issues for Congress, 
December 23, 2014, 26. 
116 Cole, The Great Wall at Sea, 197. 
117 Phillip C. Saunders et al., The Chinese Navy: Expanding Capabilities, Evolving Roles 
(Washington, DC: National Defense University, 2011), 258, 275, 
http://ndupress.ndu.edu/Portals/68/Documents/Books/chinese-navy.pdf. 
 35
capabilities. Efficiency increases produce at least a 33% improvement in areas such as 
range, speed, and accuracy, or involve a significant decrease in the number of weapons or 
platforms that must be employed to destroy a target. Capability increases provide new 
avenues for waging war or new methods of employing existing technology that did not 
exist previously, such as typically seen with the introduction of radical new technologies 
or the employment of existing technologies in new ways. 
C. HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF THE PLAN 
The PLAN has undergone several changes since the PRC was established in 1949.  
At that time China had no navy to speak of; rather, the PLAN inherited a collection of 
WWII-era patrol craft left by the KMT. Throughout the 1950s, the PLAN gained some 
Soviet shipbuilding techniques and built up a coastal force consisting primarily of patrol 
craft and diesel submarines in order to protect the mainland from Taiwanese 
incursions.118 
Following the Sino-Soviet split in 1958, China focused on a continental people’s 
war strategy, which lacked a focus on naval capability and caused the PLAN to fall into 
disarray. Additionally, The Great Leap Forward and Cultural Revolution promoted anti-
intellectualism, which significantly set back all PLA modernization efforts.119 This 
situation lasted until 1978, when a new Chinese strategy emerged and the PLAN was 
given the mission of assisting in the process of re-taking Taiwan while preventing 
American intervention.120 This constituted a need for the PLAN to operate in the near 
seas, its first mission outside of coastal waters.  
The role of the PLAN expanded throughout the 1980s, culminating in 1985 when 
China developed its first island chain strategy. The PLAN’s mission became stopping an 
adversary at a line roughly connecting Okinawa, Taiwan, and the Philippines. China’s 
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strategy at this time was to defend the industrial base, which was built around coastal 
cities.121 
The 1990s marked a critical turning point for the PLAN. In 1993, China became a 
net importer of energy, and this resulted in the need to create a true blue water Navy that 
could secure China’s economic interests.122 This caused a focus on maritime security and 
defense of the sea lines of communication (SLOC) through which this energy travels.123 
More recently, the role of the PLAN has further expanded to include defense out to the 
second island chain, anti-piracy operations, and military operations other than war 
(MOOTW).124 
This growth has happened primarily for two reasons. First, as China has 
modernized and grown economically, the PRC desires recognition as a superpower. 
Chinese leaders consider a strong naval force capable of conducting global operations as 
a hallmark of this status.125 Second, the threats against China have grown and the PRC 
seeks to prevent U.S. intervention in regional affairs. The capabilities of modern weapons 
mean that for the PLAN to protect the Chinese mainland, it must defeat its enemy farther 
out to sea than in the past, which has come to be known as China’s A2AD strategy. In 
2008, the DOD report to Congress summarized China’s A2AD strategy as, “the capacity 
to hold surface ships at risk through a layered capability reaching out to the ‘second 
island chain’ . . . to strike surface ships on the high seas or their onshore support 
infrastructure.”126  
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Thus the PLAN is the foundation of China’s A2AD strategy. This has seen the 
PLAN benefit from an increasing budget, greater roles in both military and non-military 
operations, and the influx and development of a significant amount of equipment, which 
will be seen in the innovations below.127 
D. INNOVATION IN NAVAL PLATFORMS 
A summary of innovative technologies in PLAN platform modernization, as 
discussed in this chapter, is shown in Table 1. Despite China’s rapid naval modernization, 
few of the advances have resulted in innovative platform development. Instead, these 
platforms tend to benefit from the addition of innovative weapons or systems. 
Table 1.   PLA Naval Innovation: Platforms 
Platform Organizational Efficiency Capability 
Jin SSBN X  X 
Fuchi AORH X X  
Song SS X  X 
Houbei PTG  X  
Type 726 LCAC X   
Jiangdao FFL  X X 
 
A summary of innovative technologies in PLAN weapon modernization as 
discussed in this chapter is shown in Table 2. PLAN weapons have consistently grown 
more capable, in some cases having no foreign counterparts. Furthermore, many of the 
more advanced weapons pose credible challenges to current air defense systems. In a 
2011 article, Mahnken assessed that, “the most innovative system that China seeks is the 
ability to attack moving ships at sea far from China’s shores.”128 Since then, China has 
fielded several weapons which achieve that goal, and a recent analysis argues that China 
has made significant progress with its anti-ship cruise missiles (ASCM), producing many 
world-class weapons.129 Furthermore, some of these highly advanced ASCMs have no 
                                                 
127 Fravel and Liebman, “Beyond the Moat,” 75. 
128 Mahnken, “China’s Anti-Access Strategy in Historical and Theoretical Perspective,” 314. 
129 Gormley, Erickson, and Yuan, A Low-Visibility Force Multiplier, 15. 
 38
comparable Western counterparts and, due to their capabilities, provide a high probability 
of success against even the most advanced defensive systems.  
Table 2.   PLA Naval Innovation: Weapons 
Weapon Organizational Efficiency Capability 
YU-3 X X 
YU-5 X X 
YU-6  X  
YU-7 X X 
EM-52 X X 
Mine Belt X X  
ASROC X X  
YJ-12 X X X 
YJ-18  X X 
CM-708UNA X X  
C-701  X  
C-801  X X 
DF-21D X X X 
JL-1   X 
JL-1A  X  
JL-2  X  
 
A summary of innovative technologies identified in PLAN systems modernization 
as discussed below is shown in Table 3. Initial PLAN systems innovation focused on 
creating a modern warship with integrated combat information center. Since 2000, 
however, this has shifted to an increasingly advanced collection of interconnected 







Table 3.   PLA Naval Innovation: Systems 
System Organizational Efficiency Capability 
Nuclear Submarine Propulsion X X X 
CIC  X  
SATCOM X   
SATNAV X 
Data Link X X 
Towed Array Sonar X 
ECM  X 
ESM X 
OPTRONICs X 
Missile Data Link X X  
APAR  X X 
Stealth   X 
Multiplex Data Link X X  
AESA  X  
Automated Maintenance Reporting  X  
AIP X X X 
Submarine Quieting X  X 
IADS X X  
Double Pressure Hull X 
 
1. Innovation from 1970–1980 
The only innovation identified during this period is the YU-3 torpedo. The YU-3 
had a maximum range of 13km, which provided 40% increase over previous torpedoes as 
well as incorporated acoustic homing.130 This fundamentally alters the tactics for 
conducting submarine attacks, as well as provides a change in the relationship between 
the weapon and operator, as it incorporated stand-alone guidance. This reduced the 
complexity of obtaining a firing solution and subsequently operator workload expanding 
the weapon engagement envelope. The YU-3 counts as an efficiency increase due to its 
increased range, but also constitutes an organizational increase due to the way acoustic 
homing technology changed how submarines conduct attacks. 
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2. Innovation from 1980–1990 
During this period, PLAN modernization benefitted from the increased 
importance of the PLAN’s role China’s Taiwan strategy. The 10 innovative technologies 
fielded by the PLAN during this period show a focus on low visibility, easily fielded 
methods of deterring U.S. intervention. These technologies show the PLAN’s first efforts 
to integrate sensors and weapons into a single combat system.   
a. Weapons 
The YU-5 torpedo incorporated a new type of propulsion system that doubled its 
range over previous PLAN designs, as well as utilized wire guidance for targeting 
updates, and a new proximity warhead increasing effectiveness.131 This further changed 
the relationship between weapon and operator over the YU-3. Now PLAN torpedoes 
could receive targeting updates after launch. This improves weapon accuracy and reduces 
the effectiveness of counter-measures constituting an efficiency increase. The increased 
range provided a larger engagement envelope, which increases lethality of the weapon, as 
well as increases survivability of the launching platform. Additionally, this places it 
outside the engagement range of most enemy weapons, which changes how submarines 
conduct attacks by giving them a first strike ability safely outside the range at which 
ships could launch a counter-attack.  
Mines such as the EM-52 provide stealthy, cost-effective platform designed to 
neutralize both CVNs and SSNs.132 This advance covers two areas: first, it counters a 
critical enemy technology, the CVN and its defensive formations. Second, it changes the 
relationship between weapon and operator. By allowing remote operation and long 
operational life it provides a low-cost, easily implemented and controlled method for 
denying enemy ships and submarines, access to China’s critical SLOCs.133 Because they 
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can be remotely operated, this is accomplished without the traditional limitation of 
completely closing off mined areas to a nation’s own forces. It allows friendly and 
neutral ships to safely transit mined waters without the use of safe lanes, which can be 
plotted by enemy surveillance. This greatly changes how fleets operate to defend SLOCs. 
The development of the Mine Belt allows submarines to retain a full wartime 
complement of torpedoes and missiles, while still being able to conduct anti-access 
mining operations with as many as 50 mines per submarine.134 This solves the limitation 
that mines impose in that they normally must take the place of other weapons in 
submarine launch tubes. Mine belts allow submarines to continue their normal operations 
in addition to conducting mine-warfare, without having to return to port in order to refit. 
This changes the relationship between the weapon and operator, as well as changing the 
context in which anti-surface warfare takes place. Prior to this innovation, intelligence 
analysts could determine a submarine’s mission and capability based on its weapons load 
at the docks additionally, intelligence analysts could predict areas that had been mined 
based on when submarines returned to port in order to load torpedoes following mining 
operations. Mine belts count as an organizational increase by allowing submarines to 
mine SLOCs, while still maintaining normal anti-ship attack capabilities. 
In addition to being significantly smaller than previous Chinese ASMs, the C-801 
incorporated folding wing technology, which means that twice as many missiles could be 
carried in the same space.135 This smaller size also allows the C-801 to be launched from 
a variety of aircraft in addition to surface vessels. Finally, the C-801 introduced the first 
instance of sea skimming capability in Chinese ASMs, which counters enemy radar and 
air defense technologies. This improved utilization of space counts as an efficiency 
increase, and the application of cruise missiles to light aircraft constitutes a capability 
increase. 
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The JL-1 constituted China’s first submarine launched ballistic missile (SLBM) 
capability. This changed the context of China’s nuclear deterrence forces, as submarines 
are not easily tracked and much more difficult to neutralize than land-based sites. This 
contributed to the first credible instance of a survivable second-strike capability.136 While 
the missile itself reached IOC in 1987, it was only reliably deployed from test and 
evaluation submarines until the introduction of the Jin in 2007. The adaptation of inter-
continental ballistic missile (ICBM) technology to submarines counts as a capability 
innovation.  
b. Systems 
The application of nuclear propulsion to submarines was first seen in the Han 
class and provided a nearly unlimited increase in submerged range, which fundamentally 
alters the way in which the PLAN can employ submarines. This innovation provides a 
solution to the critical weakness of conventional submarines (the requirement to 
periodically snorkel). These increases were achieved through the use of civilian nuclear 
power technology modified to work in a submarine, which also counts as a capability 
innovation. This provided the Han with a maximum speed of 25 knots, a 92% speed 
increase over previous PLAN submarines.137 While this does fulfill an efficiency 
increase, the improvement is significant enough that it also changed the way submarines 
are employed. Instead of being forced to lie in wait at a chokepoint to execute frontal 
attacks, the Han’s speed allows it to catch up to transiting ships and attack from all 
aspects. Furthermore, it has the capability to outrun most surface combatants, providing 
the ability to successfully escape following detection, increasing survivability. Nuclear 
submarine propulsion fulfills all three innovation categories. The drastic increase in speed 
fundamentally changed how submarines conduct attacks while also filling the criteria for 
efficiency increase. Finally, the application of nuclear reactors to a submarine counts as a 
capability innovation. 
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The use of satellites for navigation (SATNAV) and communication (SATCOM) 
was first demonstrated on the Ming SS, allowing more precise coordination, control, and 
secure communications while underway. In addition, this replaced the previous low 
frequency radio communications, which were easily intercepted and susceptible to 
exploitation by direction finding.138 The use of satellite technology in this manner counts 
as an organization innovation because it fundamentally changes how fleet commanders 
interact with these platforms. 
The development of the Type 88C data link allows ships to communicate with 
shore based radar sites, improving sensor coverage, allowing better coordination and 
reduced reaction times to threats. This resulted in a change in the context in which war 
takes place. This allows for much more complex maneuvers, as well as increased sensor 
coverage and cooperation among units.139 Data link counts as an organizational 
innovation by giving fleets the ability to integrate a much greater amount of information 
on friendly and enemy movements.  
The combat information center (CIC) links all of the ships sensors and weapons 
into a single control scheme providing a unified, integrated source of information as well 
as seamless handoff between weapons systems through each range of engagement, 
increasing effectiveness and reducing operator workload. CIC was first introduced as an 
incremental upgrade to the Luhu in the 1980s; however, the first ship built with a 
dedicated CIC was the Luhai in the late 1990s. It is considered the hallmark of modern 
warships, due to the manner in which it changes the relationship between weapon and 
operator.140 CIC counts as efficiency innovation because it improves coordination and 
response time within individual platforms.  
                                                 
138 Jane’s, “Jane’s Fighting Ships.” 
139 Myron Hura et al., “Tactical Data Links,” in Interoperability: A Continuing Challenge in Coalition 
Air Operations (RAND Corporation, 2000), http://www.rand.org/pubs/monograph_reports/MR1235.html. 
140 Jane’s, “Chinese Command and Weapon Control Systems,” C4ISR & Mission Systems: Maritime, 




Optoelectronics (OPTRONIC) such as the OFC-3 integrate several sensors such 
as electro-optics (EO), infra-red (IR), and low light (LL) into a self-contained system 
capable of being operated by a single person or as part of a larger integrated air defense 
system (IADS) to increase capability and weapons accuracy while decreasing reaction 
time and reducing operator workload. This counts as an efficiency innovation because it 
changes the relationship between weapon and operator to increase the combat 
effectiveness of a ship.  
3. Innovation from 1990–2000 
The 12 innovations fielded by the PLAN during this period are the result of the 
PLAN’s expanding role to provide maritime security for its SLOCs. These capabilities 
allow the PLAN to reach farther through new technology in submarine, torpedo, and 
especially cruise missiles. This period saw the IOC of the YJ-12, one of the most capable 
anti-ship weapons currently in existence. 
a. Platforms 
When the Song SS reached IOC in 1999, it was China’s first indigenous 
submarine capable of launching ASCMs while still submerged, allowing it to engage 
targets at much longer ranges and without exposing itself via surfacing. The C-801’s 
attack range of 80km resulted in a 60% increase over torpedoes, and more recent ASCMs 
such as the CM-708UNA’s 128km range provide a further improvement of 60%.141 This 
provided a counter to defensive fleet formations, specifically those based around an 
aircraft carrier. Additionally, this adds the capabilities of an entirely new class of 
weapons to submarines, which also provides for new targeting methods and integration 
with other fleet assets. When combined with over the horizon targeting, this allows the 
Song to remain undetected when carrying out an attack. The Song counts as both 
organizational and capability increases because it provided increased offensive range as 
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well as incorporated new methods for conducting coordinated attacks through the 
application of ASCM technology to submarines.  
b. Weapons 
Anti-submarine rockets (ASROC) add between 3,000–5,000m to the maximum 
range of torpedoes.142 This serves to counter enemy submarine technology by allowing 
surface ships to engage submarines outside the range at which submarines can launch a 
counter attack. The Type 81 ASROC provided a 100% increase in effective torpedo range 
over its predecessor, the Soviet RBU-1200. The Type 87 ASROC further improved this 
by an additional 56%.143 This is an organizational increase because it gives PLAN 
surface ships a credible counter to enemy submarine first strike capability. 
The YU-6 incorporated wake homing capability that vastly improves 
effectiveness and decreases operator workload.144 Wake homing changes the relationship 
between the weapon and operator by eliminating the need to acquire a targeting solution 
before firing the weapon. The YU-6 only has to be fired in the direction of a ship’s wake, 
and the torpedo itself will determine target location and course on its own. The YU-6 
counts as an efficiency innovation because it removes the requirement to calculate a 
firing solution, greatly simplifying the job of the operator. 
The YU-7 torpedo has an operating depth of 400m, providing a 33% increase over 
previous PLAN torpedoes, allowing it to engage nuclear submarines down to the limit of 
their operating depth.145 This counters a critical capability of nuclear submarines, which 
prior to the introduction of the YU-7 could dive deeper than PLAN torpedoes. The YU-7 
is also the only lightweight torpedo in the PLAN inventory capable of being launched 
from surface ships as well as aircraft.146 This extended ASW attack capability to aircraft, 
which vastly increases attack range over surface vessels. The YU-7 counts as efficiency 
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innovation by significantly increasing operating depth to counter nuclear submarines; it 
also counts as a capability increase by providing anti-submarine attack technology to 
aircraft. 
The C-701 introduced TV guidance and millimeter wave radar (MMW) targeting 
capability to ASMs. This changes how the weapon tracks targets, which greatly reduces 
the circular error probable (CEP) down to 5–10 meters and makes the job of the operator 
much easier by incorporating a fire and forget mode.147 Both technologies also reduce 
susceptibility to countermeasures and jamming. The C-701 counts as an efficiency 
innovation because of its improved accuracy and counter-countermeasures ability. 
c. Systems 
Variable depth, towed array sonar technology first employed on the Luhu allows 
for the passive detection of submarines, which changes the way in which PLAN units 
operate at sea and defend against underwater threats. These systems include variable 
depth capability and provide the most effective method of detecting enemy 
submarines.148 This counts as an organizational innovation because it fundamentally 
changes how surface ships can detect and track submarines by countering submarine 
technology that relies on acoustic stealth, provides early detection against torpedo launch 
with more precision, and unlike active sonar, does not alert a submarine to the fact that it 
has been detected.149 
Missile data link allows for weapons to be launched over the horizon, outside of 
detection range and have targeting information provided/updated mid-course, decreasing 
the chances of interception, as well as improving accuracy and lethality. This 
fundamentally changes the relationship between the weapon and operator, allowing one 
platform to launch the weapon from a safe location and the weapon can be updated either 
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by expendable platforms, or stealthy ones.150 Allowing units that are stealthy, 
expendable, or more survivable than the weapon launch platform to provide targeting 
data to weapons launched from more vulnerable platforms greatly changes fleet 
organization and operation. This application of data link counts as an organizational 
innovation because it protects the most vulnerable platforms, while simultaneously 
improving weapon accuracy.  
The Type 821 electronic surveillance measures (ESM) provide the capability to 
passively detect an enemy in a new sensor spectrum. This changes the context in which 
war takes place as it allows a ship to detect enemy combatants and weapons without 
having to give up its own location. ESM counts as capability innovation because it 
provides access to a new spectrum of information for offensive and defensive operations. 
The Type 928 electronic counter measures (ECM) provide non-consumable 
countermeasures against enemy weapon systems. This counters enemy weapon targeting 
technology without having to rely on expending a limited number of countermeasures or 
weapons trying to destroy it. ECM counts as capability innovation because it provides a 
new method for defeating enemy weapons. 
Active phased array radar (APAR) automates anti-air detection, tracking, and 
target discrimination as well as increasing detection range.151 APAR counts as an 
efficiency innovation because it changes the relationship between weapon and operator, 
as well as changing the context in which war takes place, by allowing ships to detect and 
discriminate a broader array of targets at much longer ranges than previous designs.  
Acoustic quieting technologies change the context of submarine operations in a 
manner similar to stealth technology. This category consists of several complementary 
technologies: anechoic tiles, shock absorbing engine mounts, and seven bladed propeller 
designs such as those first fielded on the Song vastly improve submarine quieting and 
propulsion efficiency. This capability was further expanded by on the Yuan SS with the 
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addition of a rubberized sonar absorbent hull coating. These features count as capability 
innovations because they provide passive counters to enemy sonar technology. 
The YJ-12 is arguably one of the most dangerous weapons fielded by the PLAN, 
or any military; it has a 500km range, ramjet engine, electronic countermeasures (ECM), 
electronic counter-counter measures (ECCM), data link, sea skimming, utilizes a multiple 
stage warhead, travels at Mach 4+, and can be carried by nearly any ship or aircraft 
operated by the PLA.152 A Naval War College study argues that the YJ-12 counters every 
air defense system currently fielded, including the U.S. Aegis radar and SM-2/3 
system.153 Additionally, it outranges competing ASMs like the Harpoon by a factor of 
3.25.154 This results in a weapon that can attack both land and sea targets at hypersonic 
speeds with a 5m CEP, and currently has no credible counters. The only comparable 
weapon currently fielded is the Russian KH-31, which has a lower speed, shorter range, 
and utilizes a less capable seeker. The YJ-12 achieves innovation in all three increase 
categories due to its significant range and speed, ability to defeat enemy IADS, and 
utilization of new propulsion technology. 
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Figure 1.  Anonymous Photo of YJ-12 ASCM155 
4. Innovation from 2000–2010 
The 13 innovations fielded by the PLAN during this time are the result of the 
further expansion of Chinese strategy out to the second island chain. These technologies 
provide the ability for the PLAN to operate for extended periods of time at sea and 
further improves the automation and integration of weapons and systems.   
a. Platforms 
The Jin SSBN provided the PLAN’s first operational submarine capable of 
reliably launching SLBMs, ensuring a survivable nuclear deterrent and vastly increasing 
striking range. This capability also allows the Jin to employ other weapons based on 
ICBM technology, like the DF-21D anti-ship ballistic missile (ASBM) and anti-satellite 
weapons (ASAT) such as the SC-19 and DN-2.156 This comprises a new way of waging 
war, but also creates a fundamental change in the context of war by merging the 
survivability and stealth of submarines with the capabilities of nuclear weapons. This 
provides China a true credible first strike option, as well as a survivable second-strike 
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capability.157 The Jin counts as a capability increase because it was the first instance of 
SLBM technology fielded in a combat deployable Chinese submarine. 
The Type 726 landing craft air cushioned (LCAC) introduced the capacity to 
conduct amphibious landings much quicker, and over longer distances than in the past, 
increasing the size of equipment and amount of forces that can be landed in a given 
amount of time.158 This changes the conduct of amphibious assaults by allowing the 
vulnerable LPD size ships to remain farther away from shore defenses. For example, the 
use of LCACs would allow an amphibious assault launched from the Chinese mainland 
to reach Taiwan in just over an hour, which would allow an initial assault to be conducted 
without the use of larger ships at all. These advantages result in less stress and fatigue 
imparted to troops being transported, allowing them to maintain readiness during the 
transit.159 This platform counts as organizational innovation because it changes the 
relationship between the craft and the operator in that it allows much smoother and 
shorter transits, bypasses traditional obstacles, and expands potential landing sites greatly 
changing the conduct of amphibious operations.160 
The Houbei class missile boat provides several innovations for guided missile 
patrol craft (PTG), including increased speed and stability in heavy seas, as well as 
stealth. While the top speed of the Houbei is not significantly greater than its 
predecessors, it can maintain this speed in much heavier seas, while still being stable 
enough to accurately launch weapons.161 Additionally, the Houbei can carry eight YJ-83 
ASCMs, a 33% increase over the larger Houjian and a 100% increase over the Houxin 
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and Houdong.162 When combined, these capabilities increase survivability and lethality, 
while reducing operator workload and fatigue.163 The increased stability of the Houbei 
changes the relationship between the weapon system and the operator. Stealth changes 
the context of war as covered in the systems section. These improvements constitute both 
efficiency and organizational increases. The Houbei counts as an efficiency innovation 
because it significantly increases weapons payload and effectiveness. 
b. Weapons 
Both upgrades to China’s SLBMs have innovative characteristics. The JL-1A 
improved upon the JL-1 by increasing maximum range by 66% and improving accuracy 
through the addition of satellite and radar guidance to reduce its CEP from 700m to 
50m.164 The JL-2 increases range an additional 220% over the JL-1A. There is some 
doubt that the JL-2 is operational, but is included here due to China’s claims that it has 
reached IOC following successful tests.165 Additionally, 2014 CRS reports indicate that 
the JL-2 began operational deployment onboard a Jin SSBN.166 Improvements to the JL 
series of SLBMs count as efficiency innovations because they significantly increase the 
range and improve the accuracy of China’s SLBM arsenal. 
c. Systems 
The development of the HN-900 and Joint Service Integrated Data Link System 
(JSIDLS) multiplex data systems provide two-way information sharing across multiple 
platforms, allowing fleets to coordinate and share sensor data along with shore-based 
installations and all their associated weapons systems. This merges all sensors and 
targeting information for combatants, as well as integrates with ASM data links. These 
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upgraded data link systems count as organizational innovations because all units in the 
fleet gain access to the same information, providing a complete threat picture, and 
allowing faster responses to orders, while the increased weapon accuracy and reduced 
reaction time constitutes an efficiency innovation. 
AIP first fielded on the Yuan class submarine provides a non-nuclear means of 
power generation that does not require oxygen to operate while submerged. This solves 
the vulnerability imposed by conventional submarine propulsion (the requirement to 
routinely snorkel), but without the added expense and complexity imposed by nuclear 
propulsion. AIP improves the submerged speed, range, and stealth of non-nuclear 
submarines by reducing or even eliminating the need to continually re-surface in order to 
charge batteries. AIP counts as capability innovation because it uses an entirely new 
technology to provide nuclear endurance, with the stealth of electric propulsion.167  
The Type 730 close-in weapon system (CIWS) increased anti-air capability and 
vastly reduced operator workload and crew requirements by automating air defense. 
Additionally, since it is a closed loop system, it has a faster reaction time than the Soviet 
AK-630 it replaced, and provides independent operation in the event other defensive 
systems become damaged.168 The pairing of radar, optics, and computer direction with a 
high rate of fire weapon provides a counter to enemy aircraft and anti-surface missiles. 
This capability is further expanded with the PLAN’s first true IADS, introduced on the 
Luyang II, which is capable of intercepting cruise missiles with CIWS as well as the 
HHQ-10/FL-3000N missile system in tube launchers.169 These systems can operate in 
isolation, but can also work as part of the integrated sensor suite in modern ships. 
Combined with the multiplex data systems, IADS now share targeting information across 
the fleet, providing the PLAN’s first “area-defense” anti-air (AAW) system.170 IADS 
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counts as efficiency and organizational increases because it fundamentally changes the 
way in which PLAN fleets conduct self defense. 
The automated maintenance reporting system first introduced on the Jiangkai II 
improves maintenance efficiency by making yard turnaround times shorter, increasing 
readiness and unit availability. This results in increased system efficiency and warship 
lethality, allowing fleets to spend more time at sea.171 This counts as an efficiency 
innovation because it changes the relationship between fleet planners, the operator, and 
the ship itself. 
Double pressure hulled submarine design such as that seen on the Shang increases 
survivability significantly. This counters enemy torpedo technology by requiring the 
employment of at least twice as many weapons to achieve the same amount of 
damage.172  
Stealth features have been incorporated in all PLAN surface combatants 
introduced since 2004. This makes surface ships harder to detect and in many cases 
almost impossible to distinguish from smaller merchant traffic, denying enemy ships the 
advantage offered by long-range search radar. This decreases susceptibility to enemy 
sensors as well as decreases the range at which enemy weapons can be employed. Stealth 
counts as a capability innovation because it provides a capability increase by changing 
the context in which surface fleets fight.  
PLAN advanced radar designs minimize operator workload as well as include 
stealth detection features. This is seen in the Dragon Eye APAR on the Luyang II and III. 
These detection systems negate the advantages of stealth, which changes the context in 
which war takes place.173 This is further improved in China’s active electronically 
scanned array (AESA) radars that further increase detection range and tracking against 
small air targets, such as cruise missiles. Because this is incorporated in the automatic 
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functions of the radar, it further improves the operator weapon relationship over APAR, 
as well as counters enemy weapon technology.  
5. Innovation from 2010–2015 
The six innovations fielded by the PLAN during this time are evidence of China’s 
two goals of achieving recognition on the global scale as a superpower, and desire to 
deter U.S. intervention in a regional conflict. These technologies include China’s first 
true global-level innovations, such as the DF-21D, which comprises a capability not yet 
fielded by any nation. 
a. Platforms 
The development of the Fuchi class of auxiliary ships changed fleet organization 
by incorporating the ability to replenish dry stores (food and ammunition) in addition to 
wet stores (fuel, oil, etc.) from the same platform while underway.174 This provided 
PLAN fleets their first ability to operate globally, while halving the number of resupply 
ships needed.175 This platform counts as efficiency innovation because it vastly increases 
the time conventional ships can spend on deployment, changing how fleets are organized 
and employed by providing full replenishment capability for blue water operations. 
The Jiangdao FFL was the first instance of a modular ship design fielded by the 
PLAN, and provides a single platform capable of fulfilling the roles of several different 
ship classes.176 It can be outfitted to conduct coastal patrol, AAW, anti-submarine 
(ASW), anti-surface (ASuW), and command and control roles.177 This results in a change 
to the relationship between the platform and the operator as it provides a single ship class 
that can be mass-produced and configured to fill all fleet roles. This advance is designed 
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to make training and maintenance more efficient, while increasing fleet size through 
standardized production without giving up capability. The Jiangdao counts as 
organizational as well as efficiency innovation because it allows a single platform to fill 
multiple fleet roles, giving fleet commanders greater flexibility.  
b. Weapons 
The recently released CM-708UNA incorporates many of the features of the YJ-
12, but in a weapon that is submarine launched. It is hypersonic, sea skimming, and has a 
range of 128km, a combination of capabilities that counters multiple enemy defensive 
technologies and vastly increases the offensive range of submarines.178 The CM-
708UNA counts as an efficiency increase because it brings advanced cruise missile 
features to submarines, allowing them to strike with increased lethality. 
The YJ-18 is the newest development in Chinese ASCM technology. It improves 
on some features of the YJ-12, while incorporating new ones. It is a dual-speed missile, 
starting off with a subsonic flight profile, and then accelerating to Mach 3+ when within 
46km of the target. This is counter to traditional ASCMs, which either maintain speed, or 
slow down due to fuel exhaustion in the terminal phase. Additionally, video from 
Chinese media claims to show the missile performing evasive S-turns prior to impact in 
order to defeat current air defense systems that are programmed to counter constant 
bearing, linear missile trajectories.179 One variant of the YJ-18 also features an 
electromagnetic pulse (EMP) warhead, which China claims can destroy 60% of any 
electronics within 50m.180 The YJ-18 counts as an efficiency innovation because is 
increases lethality by defeating current air defense systems. The use of a new warhead 
type allows it to achieve a mission kill even if it does not hit the target. 
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Figure 2.  YJ-18 Terminal Guidance Composite Image181 
The DF-21D is the anti-ship version of the DF-21 medium range ballistic missile 
(MRBM) designed to sink an aircraft carrier. According to an Office of Naval 
Intelligence assessment, it is fitted with a maneuverable reentry warhead, advanced IR 
and radar seekers, has an accuracy of five meters, and a range of 2000km; this 
combination of features makes it almost impossible to defeat with any defensive 
system.182 This provides an asymmetric counter to CVNs and the air defense networks 
designed to protect them.183 In 2010, Admiral Willard, the U.S. Pacific Commander, 
admitted in an interview that, with the DF-21D, “Beijing has successfully developed, 
tested, and deployed the world’s first weapons system capable of targeting a moving 
carrier strike group (CSG) from long-range, land-based mobile launchers.”184 The DF-
21D meets the criteria for all three innovation categories because it provides a credible, 
land based, long range anti-ship defense, it significantly improves lethality by defeating 
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enemy IADS technology, and it does all of this by incorporating new guidance to ICBM 
technology resulting in an entirely new weapon type not fielded by any other nation. 
 
Figure 3.  Chinese News Release Showing Two Large Craters on a 200-Meter-
Long Platform in the Gobi Desert Simulating the Flight Deck of an 
Aircraft Carrier185 
E. SUMMARY 
In summary, innovations are occurring across all areas of platforms, weapons, and 
systems in the PLAN. Many of the advances are in areas that provide an asymmetric 
advantage to counter what China considers the strengths of its potential adversaries. The 
modernization of the PLAN supports its role in China’s A2AD strategy and has resulted 
in significant advances and innovations, particularly in the range and lethality of weapons 
as well as systems integration and enemy detection capability. The 41 innovations 
identified here are likely more numerous than other analysts would accept due to the 
overly narrow focus of their methods. When tracked by category and over time, however, 
these innovations provide indicators for future innovation potential. As the number of 
country-level innovations increases, so does the significance of these innovations, 
ultimately leading to what would be considered global-level innovations. 
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Given that there are 41 instances of innovation, a useful comparison is how many 
technologies have been developed that were not innovative. This can be hard to quantify 
in that systems, by their nature, are typically either a part of a specific platform or 
weapon at its introduction; as such, it can be difficult to identify whether they are 
innovative. There are a total of 153 PLAN modernizations examined by this thesis. Since 
1970, 27% of modernization efforts resulted in some form of innovation.  
PLAN modernization is increasingly resulting in innovative technology. The only 
innovative technology fielded in the 1970s was the YU-3. In the 1980s, the PLAN fielded 
10 innovative technologies and in the 1990s this was increased to 12. From 2000 to 2010, 
the PLAN fielded 13 innovations and, since 2010, this has stayed steady with six 
additional innovations. Furthermore, the increase in innovative advances over time has 
culminated in China fielding technology, such as the YJ-12 and DF-21D, that meets all 
three innovation categories while also counting as innovation on the global level. This is 
not to discount technology that only meets the criteria for innovation in one or two 
categories, as systems like data link create integration across the platforms and weapons 
of the PLAN, providing significant improvement to fleet capabilities. Furthermore, while 
the YJ-18 only counts as an efficiency increase, it is of a significant magnitude that it 
poses a direct challenge to the IADS capabilities of all naval fleets. 
As the role of the PLAN has evolved, its modernization efforts have produced 
innovations to match. During the first few decades examined, a significant lag is seen 
between strategy and equivalent capability. Innovation trends over the last two decades, 
however, show that the timeline of technology development in the PLAN is drastically 
decreasing. This has resulted in a highly modern fleet that integrates the various 
capabilities of its platforms and weapons into a highly effective system of systems. Major 
innovations have occurred in categories that support China’s counter-revolution strategy. 
This has resulted in technologies that are cheap to produce and operate, such as mines, 
non-nuclear submarines, ASBMs, ASCMs, and stealth defeating radar, but that challenge 
the most expensive capabilities of other nations. 
There are still areas where China is either not innovating or is unable to innovate. 
The first is nuclear submarine quieting; while China has made significant progress with 
 59
the Shang, it is still far behind the levels obtained by modern U.S. and Russian 
submarines.186 This is likely because conventional submarines are inherently quieter, 
cheaper to produce and operate, and with the addition of AIP have sufficient range to 
support the PLAN’s role in China’s A2AD strategy. Second, China has yet to produce an 
indigenous CV class platform. While China is currently building several large hulled 
vessels, it is not yet clear whether these will all be future Type-081 amphibious assault 
ships or whether China is producing an indigenous aircraft carrier hull.187 Third, and 
perhaps most surprising, despite achieving innovations in complex propulsion such as 
AIP and ramjets, China’s ships still utilize traditional marine engines purchased from 
abroad. One example is the Yuan class submarine, which incorporates indigenous AIP, 
but German-built diesel engines.188 Similarly, China had previously claimed that 
indigenous engines powered the Liaoning CV, but it was recently revealed that these 
were actually provided by Ukraine.189 
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IV. INNOVATION IN PLA AIR FORCES 
A. OVERVIEW 
This chapter discusses innovation in PLA air and counter-air platforms, weapons, 
and systems. This includes aircraft operated by the PLAAF, the PLAN, and some 
equipment operated by the PLA ground forces. This chapter has identified 38 instances of 
technological innovation across all PLA air forces from 1970–2015, of which several 
demonstrate particularly impressive advances and several others pose sharp challenges to 
U.S. capabilities. The most significant technologies identified in this chapter are the PL-
12, JY-26, JY-27A, and JY-50. 
For this chapter, unless otherwise cited, information on equipment capabilities 
and IOC is derived from Jane’s Online, and has been corroborated with The Federation of 
American Scientists, and Global Firepower Online. Other sources referenced include 
SinoDefense.com, IISS, and CRS reports. This chapter first reviews the definition of 
innovation, provides a brief history of the PLAAF, and then discusses instances of 
innovation by decade beginning in 1970. 
The most significant finding is that China is designing its advanced weapons and 
systems to be utilized across nearly all fielded platforms. Unlike the modernization 
process undertaken by the PLAN, the PLAAF has not focused on the limited production 
of increasingly complex and expensive platforms. Rather modernization has been based 
mainly on applying indigenous upgrades and innovations to existing airframe designs. 
Only in the last decade has this included simultaneously working to develop 5th 
generation aircraft capabilities.  
The PLAAF’s approach to modernization has resulted in a handful of basic 
airframes being improved through the development of numerous variants as incremental 
advances take place. The likely reason for this is the historic problem experienced by all 
militaries: it is more expensive and more risky to try developing new aircraft than it is to 
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upgrade existing ones.190 A Naval War College study explains that it can be more 
beneficial and efficient to focus on integrating improved components into existing 
airframes because it fosters “the accumulation of improvements over short time 
periods.”191  
The strategy behind PLAAF modernization efforts also mirrors that of the PLAN 
in the concept of counter-RMA. The PLA claims to have developed and fielded ground-
based radar systems that can detect stealth aircraft with enough accuracy for weapons 
targeting.192 This negates the benefits of key technologies in U.S. aircraft such as the  
B-2, F-22, and F-35. These aircraft are extremely expensive to produce and operate, and 
include design trade-offs that decrease traditional survivability features in favor of 
stealth.193 If the PLAAF does possess its claimed anti-stealth capability, then it can 
counter the primary benefits of these advanced platforms to create a critical, asymmetric 
advantage. 
Recently, China produced its first indigenous aircraft designs, beginning with the 
J-10 and an export-only fighter, the JF-17. The use of a dual modernization track is seen 
through the continued production of existing aircraft designs enhanced with highly 
sophisticated weapons, while simultaneously working to produce fifth-generation aircraft 
such as the J-20 and J-31. This runs counter to the strategy of the United States, which is 
increasingly focused on fielding a limited number of top line aircraft and systems. While 
the J-20 and J-31 have yet to reach IOC, they are already being publicly demonstrated 
and marketed for foreign sale. In her study of global fighter development, Marcum finds 
that China has advanced to the point where its timeline for fielding fifth-generation 
fighters now matches that of the United States.194 She further asserts, “most aviation 
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experts agree that the [J-20] program has progressed at an accelerated pace, suggesting a 
higher degree of competency in the design and development stages.”195  
B. INNOVATION 
Chapter II of this thesis defines military innovation as new ways of generating 
military power, which attempt to increase effectiveness or change the manner in which a 
military functions in the field, to enhance a country’s ability to fight wars. Again, it must 
be emphasized that this definition focuses purely on technology innovation, and only in 
reference to China’s own past capabilities. This standard is lower than what other 
analysts might use and will likely result in more technologies being considered 
innovative. As stated in Chapter II, the purpose of adopting this approach is not to inflate 
China’s accomplishments or the threat it poses, but to establish an indication of the 
progress that China is making in order to judge its future potential. 
According to the definition adopted by this thesis, organizational increases 
fundamentally alter the way in which a military interacts with its own units or the enemy, 
as commonly seen with changes in coordination, communication, detection, and targeting 
capabilities. Efficiency increases produce at least a 33% improvement in areas such as 
range, speed, and accuracy, or involve a significant decrease in the number of weapons or 
platforms that must be employed to destroy a target. Capability increases provide new 
avenues for waging war or new methods of employing existing technology that did not 
exist previously, such as typically seen with the introduction of radical new technologies 
or the employment of existing technologies in new ways. 
C. HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF THE PLAAF 
Similar to the PLAN, the PLAAF has undergone several phases of modernization 
since its inception. The first phase began in 1949 when the PLAAF was founded with the 
limited mission of defending Beijing and Shanghai from a Taiwan-based attack.196 In the 
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1950s, China’s participation in the Korean War demonstrated the importance of airpower 
in support of ground forces. This resulted in the PLAAF experiencing a brief period of 
modernization and expansion when it benefitted from the ability to procure short-range 
fighters and bombers from the Soviet Union.197 
Following the Sino-Soviet split in 1958, the PLAAF lost its ability to procure 
foreign technology. Furthermore, the continental people’s war strategy adopted by China 
during this time de-emphasized the use of air power, which caused a shifting of resources 
away from the PLAAF, causing it to fall into disarray. Additionally, the highly technical 
nature of aircraft production means that it suffered disproportionately in relation to the 
other services under The Great Leap Forward and Cultural Revolution.198 
In the late 1970s, the changing strategic environment both within and surrounding 
China caused the PRC leadership to once again stress the importance of air power in 
China’s military strategy. The PLAAF worked to develop high-tech aircraft and well-
trained pilots, but ultimately produced little in the way of tangible results. Instead, the 
modernization of the PLAAF (as well as the PLAN) was subjugated to that of ground 
forces as PRC leadership placed a greater emphasis on the role played by those services 
in the defense of China’s borders.199 
In 1985, the role of the PLAAF again changed with China’s strategy of limited 
local war. This caused a focus on creating a credible defense along China’s periphery, 
which was to be accomplished mainly through the development of air superiority 
platforms. Throughout this time, however, PLAAF modernization still remained a lower 
priority than the PLA ground and naval forces, as Chinese industry lacked the ability to 
develop suitable aircraft.200 
Following the demonstration of U.S. air power in the 1991 Iraq War, the role of 
the PLAAF became more important in Chinese strategy. During this time, the PLAAF 
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finally developed its first true strategy for fighting an air war.201 This period saw the 
development of more advanced fighters and attack aircraft, which possessed the ability to 
project force out to the first island chain in support of regional defense.202 This concept 
of active defense constituted the PLAAF’s first true offensive role. This further expanded 
in 2004 when the PLAAF began to discuss operations in the space realm, culminating in 
the 2007 strategic discussion of the Integrated Air and Space Realm and use of offensive 
strikes as a deterrent.203 Recent efforts have focused on fostering “integrated 
cooperation” among all branches of the PLA in support of China’s A2AD strategy.204 
D. INNOVATION IN AIR FORCES 
A summary of innovative technologies in PLA Air platform modernization as 
discussed in this chapter is shown in Table 4. It must be noted that most of the basic 
airframes listed here originally began as foreign designs, but Chinese modifications 
constitute significant improvements such that they count as innovation. 
Table 4.   PLA Air Innovation: Platforms 
Platform Organizational Efficiency Capability 
Q-5 X 
Z-8 X  X 
H-6E-U  X X 
JH-7   X 
J-11   X 
J-8G X  X 
J-15 X   
UCAVs  X X 
 
A summary of innovative technologies in PLA air weapon modernization as 
discussed below is shown in Table 5. In a manner similar to PLAN weapons, PLAAF 
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weapons have consistently grown more capable through increased range and lethality. 
The PL-21, and TB-1 have few known counterparts, while the PL-12, and TY-90, 
incorporate capabilities that are not currently seen in weapons fielded by other nations. 
Table 5.   PLA Air Innovation: Weapons 
Weapon Organizational Efficiency Capability 
PL-5 X X 
TY-90  X X 
HJ-8B   X 
YJ-91  X X 
PL-9  X  
PL-12 X X  
AKD-10  X  
TB-1 X X  
CM-400AKG  X X 
PL-21 X X X 
HQ-9   X 
HQ-10  X  
TL-1   X 
 
A summary of innovative technologies identified in PLA air systems 
modernization as discussed below is shown in Table 6. Many of the systems innovations 
are designed to modernize existing aircraft by providing advanced capabilities without 
requiring modernization of the entire airframe. This is accomplished through the use of 
specialized pods and other bolt-on systems, which are much cheaper and easier to 
manufacture than entirely new aircraft. This allows China’s substantial fleet of older 
generation aircraft to continue to provide a credible threat, in addition to the threat posed 
by its more modern equipment. This serves the additional purpose of maintaining a fleet 
of aircraft that are not dependent on high-tech systems, which can be disabled or 
exploited. As further discussed in Chapter V, China has developed the ability to counter, 
exploit, and defeat modern systems of systems such as GPS, satellite communications, 
data-link, and radar. China’s innovation in systems allows it to operate craft suited for 
operations in degraded environments, but still capable of operating in their own 
networked system of systems. 
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Table 6.   PLA Air Innovation: Systems 
System Organizational Efficiency Capability 
Fly-by-Wire X X 
TY-3  X 
KZ-800 X  X 
HOTAS  X  
Helmet Targeting  X  
JL-10A  X  
Blue Sky   X 
KG-300G X X X 
No 613 FLIR   X 
In Flight Refueling X   
GJV289A X X  
KJ-8602 / MAWS  X X 
AESA  X  
JY-26 X  X 
JY-27A X  X 
Strap-On Guidance  X X 
JY-50 X X X 
 
1. Innovation from 1970–1980 
This thesis has not identified any instances of innovation between 1970 and 1980.  
The lack of innovation during this time period is likely a direct result of the emphasis on 
low-tech land war tactics that came out of the Cultural Revolution and Great Leap 
Forward. 
2. Innovation from 1980–1990 
The six innovations identified during this period are the result of China’s first real 
efforts to build indigenous aircraft and weapons. The PLAAF’s role in China’s periphery 
defense strategy necessitated the development of short-range weapons and the associated 
aircraft systems needed to employ them. 
a. Platforms  
The Q-5 was China’s first indigenously produced aircraft dedicated to the attack 
role. Its 2000kg weapons payload provided a 300% increase over previous platforms, and 
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its ability to carry individual bombs up to 500kg, which were twice the size carried by 
previous aircraft.205 This constitutes an efficiency increase by providing much greater 
destructive capability for the same number of aircraft, as well as allows the PLA-AF to 
strike reinforced targets by employing 500kg bombs with greater penetration 
characteristics than previous 250kg models.206 
b. Weapons  
The PL-5 was the first indigenous missile that incorporated all-aspect IR homing 
capability. This allows aircraft to engage targets from any direction, making the pilot’s 
job much easier by removing the previous limitations imposed by rear-aspect 
engagements and simplifying the targeting solution. The PL-5 also increased range of IR 
missiles by 500%, as well as incorporated a proximity fuse, and increased missile 
maneuverability to 40g, providing the ability to effectively outmaneuver evasive 
aircraft.207 This expanded the beyond visual range (BVR) attack envelope to include IR 
weapons. The PL-5 counts as an organizational increase because it fundamentally 
changed how aerial combat is conducted and how aircraft are employed in the air-to-air 
role, but also counts as an efficiency innovation due to the increased range, 
maneuverability, and lethality it provided. 
The HJ-8B anti-tank missile was the first Chinese anti-tank weapon designed for 
aircraft use. It incorporates a high explosive anti-tank (HEAT) warhead that defeats 
explosive reactive tank armor, incorporates both optical tracking and wire guidance, with 
a single hit kill probability of 90%.208 The HJ-8B counts as a capability innovation 
because it constituted the first true anti-tank capability for PLAAF aircraft. 
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c. Systems 
The TY-3 0/0 ejection seat first introduced on the J-8 significantly increases pilot 
survivability. While not a direct increase in combat efficiency, the improved survivability 
in both combat and non-combat scenarios prevents the loss of trained and qualified 
aircrew. This helps to solve the historical problem wherein trained aircrew, once lost, 
prove much more costly and difficult to replace than aircraft.209 The TY-3 counts as an 
efficiency innovation because of how significantly it increases pilot survivability. 
Hands on throttle-and-stick (HOTAS) cockpit design features were first 
incorporated on the J-8B, and later adapted to helicopter design on the Z-10. This 
combination of features greatly reduces pilot workload by allowing for normal aircraft 
operation with the pilot’s attention primarily focused outside the cockpit. According to 
aircraft systems designers, this provides the advantage of allowing “more immediate and 
effective operation during the most critical phases in the mission.”210 This improves a 
pilot’s situational awareness and war fighting ability, especially when combined with a 
heads-up display (HUD). The addition of the No. 613 helmet mounted sighting and 
weapons targeting system first introduced on JH-7 and later adapted for rotary wing use 
on the Z-10 further improves targeting accuracy and reduces pilot workload beyond that 
of just a HUD. When combined, these systems count as efficiency innovations because 
they allow a pilot to focus on employing weapons without having to take his eyes off the 
target during an attack. 
Fly-By-Wire was first introduced on J-8, improved with triple redundancy on J-
8B, and incorporated into helicopter design with the Z-10. This allows for more precise 
aircraft control while reducing pilot workload. Additionally, the integration of computers 
allows the aircraft to be flown to the edge of its performance ability without the risk of 
exceeding limitations. Finally, the use of small, redundant, digital components increases 
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survivability in the event of damage.211 Fly-by-Wire counts as an efficiency innovation 
by reducing pilot workload while simultaneously improving aircraft performance; 
however, it also is a capability innovation because this was accomplished through the 
application of computer technology to aircraft control. 
3. Innovation from 1990–2000 
The 13 innovations identified during this time period show the results of the first 
modernization efforts that truly focused on the PLAAF. China produced several 
indigenous aircraft and helicopter designs. The PLAAF’s role in China’s expanding 
regional focus fostered the development of innovative weapons and systems designed to 
enhance the capabilities of older airframes that could fill the capability gap while new 
airframes were still being developed. 
a. Platforms 
The Z-8 airframe is based on the SA 321 Super Frelon; however, it includes 
several Chinese modifications that add innovative capabilities. The most important of 
which is the ability to carry the YU-7 torpedo and C-802K ASCM.212 This provides 
alternatives to the ship-based employment of these weapon systems, extending the range 
and organization of PLA ASW and ASuW capability, and provides greater flexibility in 
fleet organization and defense. Aircraft are harder to detect and track than surface ships, 
and provide a cheap, expendable platform over the significantly more expensive ships 
that they operate from. When used as an ASCM launch platform for its parent ship, the Z-
8 extends the offensive reach of surface fleets by over 500%. In many cases, this gives 
the PLA a first strike advantage, allowing attack beyond the range at which other navies 
are even capable of responding. This combination of new weapons capability and change 
in the conduct of fleet warfare make the Z-8 both a capability and an organizational 
innovation. 
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The H-6E-U variants are the PLA-AF’s indigenous modifications to the Soviet 
TU-16-based H-6 strategic bomber. Chinese modifications include the incorporation of 
an automatic fire control that linked attack radar to an automated navigation system, as 
well as a terrain-following radar to allow precision bombing.213 This incremental series 
of modernizations applied to an existing airframe resulted in a combination of 
automations and linked systems that change the relationship between the weapon and 
operator by significantly reducing operator workload while increasing targeting accuracy 
and aircraft survivability, which counts as both a capability and an efficiency increase. 
The JH-7 was China’s first light attack aircraft developed with the capability of 
launching cruise missiles. This vastly increases the range, lethality, and survivability of 
PLA anti-ship capabilities by providing the advantage of longer range over any possible 
threats. This pairing changes the relationship between operator and weapon by providing 
a delivery platform that can be more cheaply produced than larger aircraft and ships, as 
well as being more survivable. This effectively adds the 1800km combat range of the JH-
7 to the attack range of ASCMs, resulting in up to a 1400% increase in range over 
conventional surface launchers.214 The JH-7 counts as a capability increase due to its 
ability to utilize ASCMs, extending the PLA’s sphere of influence beyond the reach of 
traditional land- and ship-launched weapons. 
While the central design of the J-11 is a copy of the Russian SU-27, it 
incorporates several technology advances indigenous to China. These include the 
incorporation of new electronics and radar into the J-11B to make it a multi-role aircraft. 
Additional upgrades include the SF-18 radar absorbent material and paint, as well as 
redesigned engine intakes, which combine to reduce its radar signature. This makes the J-
11B much harder to detect via radar, equating to a near-stealth generation 4+ or 4.5 
design that does not suffer from the limitations imposed by developing a purely stealth 
aircraft like the U.S. F-35.215 This counters enemy radar technologies as well as changes 
the context in which war takes place, by reducing or negating advantages provided by 
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enemy radar systems. The J-11 constituted an efficiency increase because of the 
improvements it provides in the radar realm. 
b. Weapons 
The PL-9 IR missile increases lethality through the incorporation of a multiple 
element seeker allowing for better target discrimination and counter-measures rejection. 
The PL-9 also incorporates infrared counter-countermeasures (IRCCM) that use digital 
signal processing within the missile itself to increase effectiveness.216 This greatly 
increases lethality by countering the critical enemy countermeasures of IR suppression 
and flares. The PL-9 counts as an efficiency increase because of the increased lethality 
and effectiveness it offers over previous weapons. 
The YJ-91 incorporates several features seen on the YJ-12 such as sea skimming, 
ramjet propulsion, and hypersonic capability. The YJ-91 adds the ability to swap 
warheads in the field, as opposed to the factory. Additionally, later models incorporate a 
single, advanced warhead that provides multiple selectable modes, providing both anti-
radiation and anti-ship capability, entirely eliminating the need to swap warheads.217 This 
changes the relationship between weapon and operator, specifically maintenance 
personnel. The increase in speed and lethality count as an efficiency increase, and the use 
of the anti-radiation seeker to target enemy IADS constitutes a capability innovation for 
aircraft. 
The TY-90 is the first air-to-air missile (AAM) specifically designed for 
helicopters. It has an 80% single-shot kill probability against helicopters.218 Due to the 
innovative design, it is smaller and weighs less than traditional AAMs. This changes how 
attack helicopters are employed, by allowing them to effectively self-escort without the 
need for dedicated fighter protection against air threats as well as ground threats. The 
TY-90 counts as an efficiency innovation due to the significant reduction in size that it 
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provides over previous AAMs. Additionally, the TY-90 counts as a capability innovation 
because it provided a true air defense weapon to Chinese helicopters.  
The HQ-9/FT-2000 air defense weapon incorporates AESA capability to provide 
ICBM defense.219 This counters the enemy ICBM weapons technology, and helps 
provide China a credible second-strike ability by assuring the survivability of some of its 
own nuclear forces in the event of a strike. The HQ-9 counts as a capability innovation 
because it provided the PLA its first indigenous ballistic missile defense. 
The HQ-10 missile used in the FL-3000 air defense system was based on the 
Russian TOR SAM. It incorporates Chinese improvements such as dual mode radar and 
imaging IR seeker, making it a fire-and-forget system capable of defeating saturation 
attacks even against supersonic targets.220 The 18-cell version of the launcher also 
incorporates automatic reloading. The HQ-10 counts as an efficiency innovation because 
it is capable of protecting against significantly more simultaneous threats than previous 
systems, as well as automating the missile reloading process, decreasing operator 
requirements. 
c. Systems 
In-flight refueling capability first introduced on the J-8D vastly extends the range 
of combat aircraft, which also increases effective weapon range.221 This changes the 
context of war and fleet operations by allowing fighters and bombers to operate and strike 
from much farther than their standard operational ranges, allowing naval fleets to remain 
safely out of enemy weapons range while conducting reconnaissance and attacks. 
Furthermore, it sets the stage for China’s first truly indigenous CV battle group by 
changing organizational aspects of how aircraft operate far from land-based facilities.  
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In-flight refueling also constitutes an efficiency innovation because it reduces the fuel 
fighters are required to carry, thus reducing weight and improving aircraft performance. 
When utilized together, the KJ-8602 radar warning receiver (RWR) and missile 
approach warning systems (MAWS) provide alerts to flight crews of enemy weapons 
launch based on EO, IR, and radar emissions while also incorporating automatic counter-
measures dispensing, which increases aircraft survivability.222 This decreases reaction 
time by eliminating the need for a pilot to notice an incoming weapon, determine what 
type of countermeasure would be best, and then dispense the appropriate one. 
Automation of the process allows a much faster reaction than the equivalent actions could 
be performed by a pilot. This combination of self-defense systems counts as an efficiency 
innovation by increasing survivability through the incorporation of counter-measures.  
The Blue Sky low-altitude navigation pod combines terrain following radar, 
synthetic aperture radar, and forward looking infrared (FLIR), to allow traditionally non-
attack aircraft to perform attack roles, especially when paired with multi-role, all-
platform weapons such as the TB-1.223 It also adds all-weather terrain following and 
night attack ability to all platforms. This technology provides a capability increase 
because it allows older aircraft to utilize modern weapons, without requiring a refit of the 
entire aircraft.  
4. Innovation from 2000–2010 
The ten innovative technologies identified during this period provide further 
capability increases to older airframes in order to make them competitive with the fourth- 
and fifth-generation designs of other militaries. This includes capabilities such as 
jamming, advanced radar, and precision guided weapons. 
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The J-8G was the first indigenously designed aircraft dedicated to suppression of 
enemy air defenses (SEAD). It includes a dedicated fire control system for anti-radiation 
operations, as well as incorporates ESM, and can carry the anti-radiation variant of the 
YJ-91.224 This capability allows the PLA to penetrate and disable enemy air defenses 
prior to conducting dedicated strikes. This changes the organization and utilization of 
other platforms and weapons by allowing SEAD aircraft to weaken or neutralize enemy 
air defenses before conducting weapon strikes, greatly increasing offensive capability and 
reducing the number of weapons required to overcome enemy air defenses, in addition to 
increasing the survivability of aircraft delivering these weapons. This counters the critical 
technology of enemy air defense networks, by specifically targeting the systems that are 
designed to destroy incoming weapons such as the SM-2 and SM-3. The J-8G constitutes 
an organizational innovation because it provides a single aircraft to defeat enemy air 
defenses and allows the rest of the aircraft to attack more efficiently. It also counts as a 
capability increase because of the ability to specifically target and neutralize enemy 
defensive systems. 
b. Weapons 
The AKD-10 is a derivative of the HJ-10 air to surface missile that utilizes a 
combined EO, IR, and MMW radar seeker to achieve 3m CEP and an 80% single-hit kill 
probability.225 This provides greater versatility and accuracy when engaging targets. The 
multiple seeker modes can defeat traditional counter-measure systems, which 
traditionally only protect against a single or dual threat. The AKD-10 counts as an 
efficiency innovation because the utilization of a multi-spectrum seeker greatly improves 
weapon accuracy. 
The TL series of missiles are compact weapons designed for use by both 
helicopters and drones. This series of missiles includes multi-nationality GPS guidance, 
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INS, and optical target recognition. The TL-2 incorporates utilizes Laser, IR, and MMW 
guidance to achieve a CEP of 2m.226 The TL missiles count as a capability innovation 
because they provide precision guidance weapon capability to drones. 
c. Systems 
The KZ-800 is an electronic intelligence (ELINT) radar first fielded on the Y-
8JB. This provides the benefits of a ground radar site, but with much longer ranges, more 
versatility and in a survivable platform. This counts as an organizational increase because 
it changes the context of air warfare, as well as the relationship between weapon and 
operator by incorporating ground based radar technology to aircraft. 
GJV289A is the designation for Chinese aircraft data bus system. It provides the 
ability to utilize indigenous Chinese weapons, as well as Western weapons based on the 
U.S. MIL-STD-1553B standard.227 In addition, it allows GPS-capable Chinese aircraft 
and weapons to utilize three different GPS constellations: U.S. GPS, Chinese Beidou, and 
Russian GLONASS. This provides PLA forces the ability to utilize a multitude of 
weapons, expanding supply options. In addition, the ability to switch between GPS 
networks provides redundancy for both navigation and precision weapons guidance 
during a combat scenario in which either Chinese or U.S. systems are compromised. This 
provides an organizational innovation because it allows PLA aircraft to utilize indigenous 
GPS guidance, or foreign GPS guidance if Chinese networks become compromised. 
AESA air radar introduced on J-10 allows for radar use while remaining stealthy, 
is resistant to jamming, and provides redundancy and greater targeting accuracy. This 
changes context in which war takes place by reducing jamming effectiveness and 
maintaining stealth capabilities.228 
Strap-on precision guidance kits allow traditional, unguided weapons to have 
precision strike ability through the addition of inertial, laser, satellite, or imaging 
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guidance. These kits combined with the No. 613 FLIR/Laser pod provide a low-cost 
imaging and attack capability to all PLA aircraft. This counts as a capability increase 
because it adds precision targeting to aircraft not traditionally able to perform such roles, 
and does so more economically than modernizing all of China’s older aircraft.229 
Additionally, the FT-3, FT-4, and FT-6 kits add glide ability, which lowers pilot 
workload while increasing weapon effectiveness and accuracy. It also adds glide ability, 
which increases range and standoff.230 
The JL-10A pulse Doppler radar provided greater targeting precision with a lower 
power requirement than previous designs. This makes it harder to detect by ESM 
systems, while also providing greater capability through the ability to track targets low to 
the ground.231 Previous radars were unable to detect targets significantly below the 
altitude of the radar itself due to interference with ground returns. The JL-10A counts as 
an efficiency innovation because it increased detection capability while reducing 
susceptibility to ESM. 
The KG-300G jamming pod provides digital radio frequency memory (DRFM) 
jamming to all aircraft including helicopters, a drastic capability increase. This type of 
ECM jams enemy targeting radar, as well as missiles.232 The KH-300G counts as an 
efficiency increase because it increases survivability by countering enemy sensor and 
weapon technology. Additionally, it provides a capability increase by providing modular 
SEAD ability to non-SEAD and older aircraft not equipped with ECM. Finally, this 
serves as an organizational innovation because it adds SEAD capability to existing strike 
aircraft, which improves strike package organization and capability without requiring a 
change of composition. 
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5. Innovation from 2010–2015 
The nine innovations identified during this time show rapid progress in 
developing advanced capabilities to rival other nations. These include highly capable 
drones and multi-role, multi-platform missiles like the TB-1. Additionally, missiles such 
as the PL-12 and CM-400AKG count as innovative technology on the global scale. 
a. Platforms 
The J-15 is China’s first indigenously produced aircraft designed to operate from 
an aircraft carrier. Like other platforms, its basic airframe is based on the Russian SU-30, 
but has been extensively modified by China to accommodate CV operations.233 This 
capability greatly changes fleet organization and composition. Combined with the 
Liaoning CV, it gives China a mobile platform allowing for aircraft operations away from 
China’s shores and increases the offensive range of surface fleets. 
Drones are an area of the PLAAF where specific information is scarce. Based on 
arms show demonstrations, enough is known to make some general determinations about 
capabilities. China is producing a wide array of drones for various roles from ISR, to land 
attack, and even anti-air defense. A notable example is the Dark Sword UCAV, which 
was unveiled at the 2006 Zhuhai airshow, was first operated in 2008, and is claimed to be 
the world’s first supersonic drone. Additionally, it incorporates stealth, and is designed 
for anti-air missions.234 Overarching trends in drone design include the incorporation of 
stealth features, high-altitude capability, internal weapon bays, and an array of precision-
guided as well as glide bombs. These weapons boast a CEP of 3m, which is a significant 
upgrade from the 15m CEP typical bombs launched from aircraft.235 This provides an 
efficiency increase by improving weapon accuracy without the need to risk pilots in 
combat. 
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Figure 4.  Dark Sword AAW UCAV236 
b. Weapons 
According to Jane’s, the TB-1 is one of the few dual-role weapons of its kind 
fielded anywhere.237 Based on proven MANPAD designs, it is effective against both 
ground and air targets, as well as being able to be employed by both aircraft and ground 
forces via handheld launcher. This changes the way in which forces are equipped and 
trained by providing commonality for supplying parts and training. Additionally, the  
TB-1 allows units to attack a wider variety of targets with the same weapon, expanding 
capability in a truly multi-role manner and simplifying aircraft load selection. This is 
further improved with its multi-mode warhead, which incorporates an advanced shaped-
charge armor penetrating, blast-fragmentation warhead. This makes the TB-1 effective 
against armored, unarmored, and aerial targets. These capabilities allow the TB-1 to 
effectively fill the role of four different weapon types: AAM, AGM, SAM, and SSM, 
changing the relationship between weapon and operator. While the TB-1 incorporates 
features that provide an organizational increase, it also includes an efficiency increase as 
it allows for a single weapon that can engage a wider variety of targets. 
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Figure 5.  TB-1 Dual-Role Missile238 
The PL-12 provides a 300% range increase over the PL-11 and was the first 
Chinese BVR, fire-and-forget radar guided missile. It is also the first operational instance 
of a active/passive dual radar missile fielded by any military; it includes data-link, and 
can track four targets simultaneously. The active/passive dual radar seeker allows for the 
weapon to be launched without being detected by enemy ESM and ECM systems, which 
drastically decreases the time a target aircraft has to react. This changes the context of 
aerial warfare by countering enemy defensive technology. The fire and forget 
functionality reduces pilot workload and increases lethality by making the weapon self-
seeking, allowing the pilot to focus on other tasks following launch.239 
The PL-21 combines ramjet and solid rocket motor propulsion to vastly increase 
its range and speed over previous AAMs. This allows the PL-21 to catch targets that can 
outrun traditional rocket-powered missiles. Additionally, the range of the PL-21 gives 
PLAAN aircraft a first shot advantage over Western counterparts and could potentially 
allow Chinese aircraft to attack and retreat before an opponent could ever launch a 
counter attack. The PL-21 counts as an efficiency innovation by changing the relationship 
between weapon and pilot by allowing rear-aspect shots even against high-speed fleeing 
targets at long ranges, as well as providing a first-shot capability in combat.240 This also 
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counts as an organizational innovation by changing the conduct of air warfare through the 
PL-21’s ability to catch long-range targets. Finally, the accomplishment of this through 
the introduction of ramjet propulsion counts as a capability innovation. 
The CM-400AKG incorporates ballistic missile technology applied to aircraft-
launched weapons. This results in a weapon that can attack both land and sea targets at 
hypersonic speeds. It is highly accurate, with a 5m CEP out to a range of 250km.241 It 
can be used by the JH-7A, the J-11, and the JF-17. This counts as a capability increase 
because it is ballistic missile technology applied to an aircraft-fired weapon. 
Additionally, the increase in range and use of an evasive flight profile to defeat IADS 
constitutes an efficiency innovation. 
c. Systems 
The JY-26 and JY-27A AESA radars add both anti-stealth and anti-ICBM 
capability to Chinese IADS. 242 These radars include manned and automatic modes, 
modular design, and high levels of integration with fire control radars and weapon 
systems, as well as electronic ECCM.243 The JY-27A utilizes VHF in a new way to 
counter-stealth, while the JY-26 radar does the same, using UHF, in a road mobile 
system.244 Further, no Western equivalents exist for these two systems. These systems 
count as a capability increase because they constitute the first radars capable to detecting 
and tracking stealth aircraft. 
The JY-50 constitutes a new technology for detecting aircraft, including those 
utilizing stealth. It is a completely passive system, using emissions from RF signals from 
everyday objects, including civilian mobile phone, radio, and television broadcasts, to 
identify targets. This passive ability makes the JY-50 highly survivable against counter-
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detection and attack, defeating enemy ESM, SEAD, and stealth technology. This changes 
the organization of air defense by providing an IADS system that facilitates the launch of 
AAMs in a way that cannot be detected by enemy aircraft. The JY-50 counts as a 
capability innovation because it utilizes an entire spectrum of information in a new 
manner.245 
E. SUMMARY 
The 38 innovations identified here are more numerous than what other analysts 
would assess given their overly narrow scope of analysis. However, when tracked by 
category and over time, this approach shows how innovation in the PLAAF is increasing 
over time in accordance with the expansion of the PLAAF’s role in Chinese military 
strategy. The PLAAF fielded no innovative technology in the 1970s. From 1980–1990, 
the PLAAF fielded six technological innovations, and from 1990–2000 an additional 13 
innovative technologies reached IOC. From 2000–2010 it fielded 10, and between 2010–
2015 it has already fielded nine, of which four can be considered global-level 
innovations: the Dark Sword UCAV, PL-12, JY-26/27A, and JY-50. 
The most significant innovations consist of multiple increases, such as the KG-
300G, JY-50, and PL-21; however, as with the PLAN, technology that does not meet all 
increase categories can still count as innovation on the global scale. The use of AAW 
UCAVs presents a unique capability for China. Currently, no other military is fielding 
unmanned craft that are supersonic or used to perform air defense. This would allow 
China to extend its defensive range farther from its home shores in a wartime scenario 
without placing its manned aircraft at risk.  
China is still in the process of developing its own fifth-generation fighters to rival 
those fielded by the United States; however, the United States is still the only nation 
fielding such aircraft. At the same time, however, China is not relying on the 
development of this technology. Instead, the PLAAF is very focused on developing 
systems that enhance the capabilities of its existing aircraft. Of the systems and weapons 
                                                 




examined for this chapter, many are designed to be employed by the early- as well as 
late-generation aircraft and helicopters fielded by the PLA. This provides a dual-track to 
modernization whereby China benefits from modern technological capabilities, without 
having to replace its current inventory of aircraft. 
China’s counter-RMA strategy can also be seen in systems modernization, many 
of which are specifically designed to counter foreign technologies, as evidenced by the 
development of ground-based stealth-detecting radar. Furthermore, the use of older 
aircraft designs coupled with modern anti-air and anti-ship weapons exploits the 
limitations of modern fleet defense, which have difficulty in dealing with large numbers 
of simultaneous threats. Additionally, when completed, the PLAAF’s own stealth aircraft 
under development will take advantage of the lack of stealth detection fielded by other 
nations. Within the role of A2AD, this combination of cheap platforms with highly 
capable detection systems and weapons greatly enhances combat effectiveness and in 
turn deterrence. 
Finally, several of China’s weapon systems incorporate design features that are 
innovative on the global scale. One notable example of this is the TB-1, which serves as 
an AAM, AGM, SAM and SSM, all in a single weapon. Additionally, the PL-12 and PL-
21 incorporate features that make them extremely capable, and hard to counter. If China’s 
claims are true, then the JY-26, JY-27A, and JY-50 all change the context in which future 
wars will take place. The United States has invested significantly in stealth technology by 
intentionally setting the F-35 program up to have a monopoly over the future of U.S. air 
power.246 Due to the complexity and expense involved in the J-35, it has sacrificed 
traditional performance to meet this need. If China’s newest radars can detect and target 
stealth aircraft, then these expensive platforms no longer provide any advantage over 
older, inexpensive aircraft that can be mass-produced.247 Additionally, in order to help 
fund the F-35 program, the United States has convinced its allies, including Japan and 
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South Korea, to purchase it as well.248 This gives China a significant advantage over 
potential regional rivals, further strengthening its A2AD capability. 
Weapons modernization has seen a steady increase of performance with advanced 
weapons replacing aging ones. In some cases, these weapons comprise entirely new types 
not fielded by other militaries, while others were developed through significant 
improvements applied to collaborative designs. These modernizations show an increasing 
ability reach farther with more lethality, increasing PLA capabilities beyond that of 
potential adversaries.249  
Most of the innovations are occurring in the category of weapons, but also are 
seen increasingly in systems. Again, the influence of counter-RMA is prominent. The 
most significant systems ensure air superiority within the second island chain as required 
by China’s A2AD strategy. The PL-12 and PL-21 target weaknesses in fighter design, 
while the KG-300G ECM pod and JY series of radars enhance the self-defense capability 
of China’s own platforms. These systems are much cheaper to produce and operate than 
the equipment they are designed to counter, in addition to having much shorter 
development timelines.250 
Given that there are 38 instances of innovation, a useful comparison is the number 
of technologies developed that were not innovative. This can be hard to quantify in that 
systems, by their nature, are typically either a part of a specific platform or weapon at its 
introduction. There are a total of 213 PLAAF modernization technologies examined by 
this thesis. Based on those technologies, since 1970, 18% of modernization efforts 
resulted in some form of innovative technology.  
There are still areas where China is not innovating, or may be unable to innovate. 
The first of these is jet aircraft engines. China has finally begun serial production of its 
WS-10 engine, but output is still low and there are reports of tolerance problems on 
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precision manufacturing equipment. Additionally, the engines must be serviced much 
more often than Western counterparts. This has resulted in the continued use of Russian 
engines in most PLAAF aircraft. There is also some question as to whether China is able 
to truly produce fifth-generation stealth aircraft. What production has occurred is often 
credited to espionage rather than indigenous development. Currently, China has only 
produced two indigenous airframes, both of which qualify as fourth-generation, multirole 
fighters. All others it operates are still based on foreign platforms, although they are so 
highly modified at this point that they bear little resemblance to their original designs. 










A. ASSESSMENT OF INNOVATION IN CHINESE MILITARY 
MODERNIZATION 
This thesis examined an array of literature to develop a definition for innovation 
that suits the purpose of identifying military innovation. It then narrowed the scope of 
analysis to focus specifically on technology innovation and created a standard in order to 
determine which technological advances actually count as innovation. Finally, it applied 
this standard to the modernization of PLA naval and air forces since 1970 in order to 
identify specific instances of technological innovation. This thesis has found that, as the 
roles of the PLAN and PLAAF have become more important to Chinese military strategy, 
their resulting modernization has resulted in an increasing number of innovative 
technologies and that the accumulation of country-level innovation within China has 
resulted in several global innovations. 
What this thesis has found is that China is increasingly focused on fielding world-
class technologies. It has developed equipment that rivals that of the top militaries, and in 
some cases, exceeds them in capability. As China continues to innovate in relation to its 
past capabilities, it is beginning to develop technology that counts as innovation on the 
global scale. Despite these advances, there are still areas where China has not yet been 
able to catch up, primarily nuclear submarine quieting, jet engine production, and aircraft 
carrier design. Recent news reports indicate that China has recently begun construction 
on its first indigenous carrier, however.251 
In cases where it has not caught up, China has innovated in areas that provide an 
asymmetric advantage. Examples of this are seen in its expansive anti-ship missile 
programs specifically designed to counter U.S. CVNs and stealth-detecting radar 
designed to defeat U.S. fifth-generation aircraft. Furthermore, the combination of its 
technological developments and its security situation both in Asia and with the United 
States is causing the PLA to undergo a period of doctrinal change. Instead of merely 
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focusing on developing a limited number of highly capable platforms, weapons, and 
systems, China is following a dual-track of modernization whereby it is innovating 
advanced systems of its own, but is also developing systems that enable its current force 
structure to be much more capable in a future conflict. This is best seen as a counter to 
the U.S. doctrine of overwhelming force through technological superiority. China’s self-
described counter-revolution in military affairs can best be characterized as numerical 
superiority combined with current technology to exploit the capability gap to turn an 
enemy’s strength into weakness. 
1. Technological Innovation 
The approach taken by this thesis, which focuses on country-level technology 
innovation, sets a lower standard than what many other analysts accept. This is not 
designed to overstate the threat that China poses, but rather to assess how modernization 
has progressed within China up to this point. This method shows that innovation within 
China has increased to match the needs of the PLA’s expanding role in Chinese strategy. 
This increasing number of innovations has resulted in several breakout technologies that 
count as innovation on the global scale. Based on the trends identified here, China will 
likely continue to innovate both in relation to its past capabilities, as well as on the global 
scale. 
Determining the actual percentage of military modernizations that count as 
innovation is difficult, since not all modernization consists of new programs. This thesis 
identified a combined total of 79 instances of technological innovation in the PLAN and 
PLAAF since 1970. Of those 79 instances, half have occurred in the last 15 years, while 
nearly one-fifth (15) took place in the last five years, including all of China’s global-level 
innovations. Several of the most significant technologies (nuclear submarine propulsion, 
AIP, DF-21D, YJ-12, PL-21, JY-50, and KG-300G) fulfill all three increase categories. 
Additionally, some innovations only fulfill one or two increase categories but still 
constitute significant capabilities: multiplex data link, YJ-18, PL-12, JY-26 and JY-27A. 
The DF-21D, YJ-12, PL-12, JY-26, JY-27A, and JY-50 all constitute global-level 
innovations as they incorporate technological capabilities not seen anywhere else.  
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Chinese modernization has been based on what it calls counter-RMA. This 
involves finding efficient methods to take advantage of the technological gap between 
China and potential adversaries to turn enemy strengths into weaknesses. This has 
primarily been accomplished through innovations in both weapons and the systems that 
support them.252 In parallel with its counter-RMA, China is also focused on overall 
modernization of its forces and does not accept its current technological capabilities as a 
limiting factor. China sees itself as a great power, and is working to develop what it 
considers great power technologies such as aircraft carriers, and fifth-generation aircraft. 
China is capitalizing on what capabilities it does have, while still striving to develop 
technology that is equivalent or superior to that fielded by the top militaries of the world.  
Not all of China’s technological modernization counts as innovation and there 
certainly are still gaps. A RAND study from 2005 noted that, at the time, China was 
making significant progress in its modernization, but was still procuring a significant 
amount of specialized, high-tech military equipment from abroad, specifically jet 
engines, electronics, and weapons control systems.253 Recent developments in the 
Chinese military industry show how far China has come in the 10 years since RAND 
made its assessment.  
In the time since the RAND report was compiled, China has effectively caught 
up, and is now producing indigenous equipment in most of these categories. For example, 
China has begun serial production of its first modern jet engine, the WS-10. China has 
also cancelled several arms deals with Russia because it claims that Russian electronics 
technology no longer meets the PLA’s needs. Specifically, China replaced its SU-27 
fighter contract with the multi-role J-11, its own version of the airframe utilizing 
indigenous electronics, radar, and cockpit systems. Additionally, China cancelled further 
purchases of the Soviet Kh-31P missile system and instead developed the YJ-91, 
incorporating a Chinese multi-function warhead and multi-mode seeker to provide 
improved performance.  
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China has also demonstrated the ability in some cases to produce more advanced 
capability than the United States and Russia.254 PLAN and PLAAF modernization 
programs have resulted in an increasing number of innovative technologies being fielded, 
including ones that count as innovation on the global scale. China’s new series of JY anti-
air radar systems are the first of their kind, and the DF-21D is the first instance of an 
ASBM fielded by any military. In 2005, China was not considered capable of such 
innovations, but today it possesses not only the ability to produce these increasingly 
advanced components but is innovating capabilities in these areas beyond what other 
nations have produced. Furthermore, China claims to have made advances towards 
producing other technologies that no other nation has yet fielded, such as hypersonic 
weapons, railguns, and super cavitating submarines.255 
There are, however, areas this thesis has identified where China has not 
innovated. These areas include marine diesel and turbine propulsion systems, nuclear 
submarine quieting, high-performance jet engines, and aircraft carrier design. Although 
based on the way current innovations meet the needs of China’s overall strategy, it is 
possible that these are areas where China does not feel it needs to innovate in order 
achieve its goal of deterrence. 
2. Doctrinal Adaptation 
As discussed in Chapter II, many analysts claim that China’s modernizations do 
not constitute innovation because its technological advances are not accompanied by 
doctrinal changes. Contrary to that view, however, research shows that the PLA has been 
adapting its doctrine to better utilize innovative technologies in support of its A2AD 
strategy. As discussed in Chapter II, doctrinal change is actually very rare, and tends to 
occur mainly in combat as opposed to peacetime. While China has not been involved in 
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any recent conflicts through which to test and develop its doctrine, it does study other 
nations’ wars in order to develop its own modern doctrine before conflict occurs.256 
Russell and Dombrowski both argue that rather than new doctrines leading to new 
technology, doctrinal change occurs from a combination of technological capability and 
the strategic environment. This thesis has found that the PLA conforms to this view as 
evidenced by several factors. The first is that PLA military academies currently focus on 
teaching counter-RMA, a concept based on addressing China’s security situation in light 
of the capability gap between itself and other nations.257 Second, research finds that 
traditional methods used to identify innovative doctrine in the PLA fail to yield 
significant results because they are based on the prevalence of U.S. terms appearing in 
PLA literature, and in reality China’s unique approach to the use of ballistic missiles is 
just one example of its doctrinal innovation.258 Recent studies note that the PLA has 
integrated Joint Operations, information sharing, and complex maneuvering to classroom 
training as well as in the field.259 Additionally, the DOD has documented changes in 
current PLA military operations including exercises, participation in international task 
forces, and CV operations demonstrating advanced capabilities.260  
An analysis conducted by the U.S. Naval War College determined that the PLA is 
changing the way it recruits, trains, and educates its personnel to better make use of 
increasingly sophisticated technology.261 In his study of China’s A2AD strategy, 
Christoper Yung assesses, “the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) will continue 
participating in exercises that stress combined arms ground-sea-air operations; 
amphibious operations; coordination among surface combatants, air forces, and sub-
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surface forces; command and control of forces afloat, in the air, and ashore; and a 
combination of general purpose forces with ballistic missiles and other Second Artillery 
forces.”262 Even the DOD’s 2014 report to Congress highlighted China’s focus on 
utilizing new technologies, such as information warfare, to gain an asymmetric advantage 
in its A2AD strategy.263  These analyses do not show a PLA that is confined to a static 
and unchanging doctrine. Rather, they show that China is adapting its doctrine to match 
development of innovative technology in order to respond to its strategic environment. 
3. Joint Ventures and Espionage 
Some analysts assert that many of China’s development programs originated from 
joint ventures with other countries, and thus are not truly indigenous. This view fails to 
acknowledge that many modernization programs undertaken by nations are composed of 
joint efforts, especially recent work on fourth- and fifth-generation fighters.264 This 
includes the Russian-Indian PAK-FA and multinational F-35. Even Russia, one of the 
few nations capable of building indigenous ships of all classes, outsourced construction 
of its newest LHD to France.265 Also, while modern carrier aviation is most often 
associated with the United States, all the hallmark innovations of modern aircraft carriers 
(the angled deck, optical lens landing system, and steam catapult) were developed by 
England.266 Even the U.S. spaceflight and ICBM programs arguably would not have been 
possible without the knowledge acquired through the influx of German scientists 
captured after the second world war.267 Furthermore, the father of China’s space and 
missile industry, Qian Xuesen, was a founding member of the U.S. Jet Propulsion Lab 
before being deported to China and founding China’s own aerospace research and 
development organization.268  
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China’s use of espionage combined with its technological advances has provided 
it a unique opportunity to study U.S. military equipment in order to identify capabilities 
and weaknesses prior to combat. Numerous reports have highlighted China’s use of 
espionage to gain knowledge of key foreign military systems such as the F-22 and F-
35.269 A GAO report also found that a significant amount of counterfeit components have 
appeared in supply chains for a variety of U.S. military equipment.270 The use of 
espionage to identify or create critical weaknesses in otherwise superior technology is 
further evidence of the counter-RMA element of China’s A2AD strategy. 
B. IMPLICATIONS FOR UNITED STATES POLICY 
As explained in Chapter I, U.S. military strategy and doctrine is based on the 
concept of overwhelming force gained through technological superiority. This thesis 
assesses that China has developed its own viable strategy based around leveraging 
asymmetric advantages.271 The PLA has innovated weapons with the advantage of longer 
range, flight profiles, and ECM all specifically developed to target weaknesses in critical 
enemy systems. Common arguments point to the superior number of U.S. aircraft carriers 
and ballistic missile submarines as evidence that it can defeat China. This, however, fails 
to take into account the vulnerability and cost associated with such platforms, especially 
given the range advantage possessed by PLA anti-surface weaponry. 
China has built a layered redundancy such that it possesses the capability to match 
or even defeat the U.S. technological advantage through both physical and cyber efforts. 
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Additionally, the PLA possesses the ability to continue to operate in technologically 
degraded environments by using its older platforms to deliver self-guiding weapons such 
as anti-radiation missiles, wake-homing torpedoes, and programmable mines to attack 
U.S. ships. The United States has all but abandoned its ability to operate in such an 
environment in pursuit of creating the most technologically superior force possible. It has 
not planned or trained for operations in a degraded environment where it loses the 
information advantage.272 Thus if the U.S. military wishes to prepare for a potential 
conflict in Asia, it must adapt its doctrine and training to this new strategic environment 
and the challenges it brings.273 
In 2011, VADM Dorsett, the U.S. Navy’s senior intelligence officer, stated that 
the “Defense Department ‘certainly would not have expected [the Chinese] to be as far 
along as they are today’ in technology and has argued that the Pentagon needs to refine 
its intelligence on military matters in China.”274  That this development was unexpected 
is direct testament to the usefulness of this thesis’ the method of analysis.  Since 1970, 
the PLA has fielded an increasing amount of country-level innovations. As the rate of 
development of these innovations has increased over time, so have their capabilities. This 
has culminated in several global-level innovations that have come as a surprise to most 
analysts.275 
1. Chinese Deterrence 
Sun Tzu taught that, “knowing the place and the time of the coming battle, we 
may concentrate from the greatest distances in order to fight.”276 These lessons provide 
fitting descriptions of China’s A2AD strategy. It is obvious that any conflict in Asia will 
occur within either the first or second island chains. Thus if the U.S. wishes to act in 
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Asia, it must do so by projecting its forces across the Pacific Ocean. As seen in Figure 6, 
China has built a layered defense with the ability to strike targets anywhere in this region 
with weapons that can be safely launched from its homeland.  
 
Figure 6.   China’s Conventional A2AD Capabilities277 
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Based on Thomas Schelling’s analysis of the relation between military technology 
and deterrence, it is clear that China falls directly under his ideal type for a deterrent 
force.278 That is, China has developed equipment, which deters an attack on itself, yet 
does not itself require an offensive strategy. Chinese strategy documents reveal that 
China’s A2AD strategy is based around raising the cost of power projection and 
intervention in Asia by raising the threshold of destruction, loss, and pain that China can 
inflict on another nation in order to contain intervention.279  China has embraced a 
defense that makes the cost of initiating an attack on China extremely costly to any 
aggressor.280 
China has identified critical vulnerabilities in U.S. capabilities and has innovated 
technologies to exploit them. The most obvious areas are in anti-surface capacity. The 
PLA currently fields weapons that can attack or neutralize U.S. aircraft carriers at ranges 
far beyond the range at which the CVN’s own weapons and aircraft can reach. 
Additionally, even with the integrated air defense network of U.S. fleets, there is a 
limited capacity for these networks to defend against the vast number and complexity of 
weapons that China can bring to bear.  Furthermore, even U.S. military leaders admit the 
limits of stealth technology in relation to China’s ability to detect and target these 
aircraft.281 
This means that the U.S. Pacific pivot is unlikely to deter China’s increasingly 
antagonistic actions in Asia. In addition to the PLA’s anti-ship capabilities, China 
possesses the ability to disable or degrade other critical U.S. technologies such as data-
link, GPS, satellite communications, and radar; while simultaneously providing 
redundancy and alternatives for these capabilities within its own forces. For example, 
Chinese precision-guided munitions can utilize any of the three currently operational 
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GNSS constellations, whereas U.S. forces can only utilize their own indigenous GPS. 
This is encompassed in comments by U.S. Secretary of Defense Gates in a 2010 speech, 
“We simply cannot afford to perpetuate a status quo that heaps more and more expensive 
technologies onto fewer and fewer platforms—thereby risking a situation where some of 
our greatest capital expenditures go toward weapons and ships that could potentially 
become wasting assets.”282 
C. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE UNITED STATES 
Unless the United States is willing to abandon its presence in the Atlantic and 
shift almost all of its assets to the Pacific, any rebalancing of forces will prove 
insufficient to gain numerical superiority over the PLA in the Pacific.283 The United 
States has strong ties to its allies Japan and South Korea, which include the basing of 
U.S. service members and military equipment in those countries as well as cooperative 
security agreements. While China has made no indication that it wishes to replace the 
United States as a global hegemon, it has explicitly proclaimed the desire to exert more 
influence in Asia to become the dominant force in the region.284 
Additionally, as discussed in Chapter II, there are numerous historical instances of 
intelligence services failing to identify innovative technology fielded by other nations.  
Intelligence services can use the approach followed by this thesis in order to track 
increases in country-level innovation over time. The changes in country-level innovation 
can then be used to provide indicators for current and future global innovation potential.  
These indicators provide the context that is lacking in other methods that fail to identify 
the first globally innovative technologies produced by rising powers. 
D. AVENUES FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
This thesis focused on innovation in the PLAN and PLAAF, as they are critical to 
China’s A2AD strategy. Additionally, modernization timelines for both services can be 
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tracked and compared to the emphasis each service received as part of China’s evolving 
strategy.  
There are several areas where future research could build upon this thesis. The 
first is expanding to conduct an assessment of other branches of China’s military such as 
PLA ground and non-conventional forces. An assessment of other PLA forces would fill 
out the picture of the entirety of Chinese military modernization and allow for 
assessments to determine if innovations are affected by the larger strategy.  
There would likely be a significant amount of innovation in non-conventional 
forces, specifically ones that provide an ideal low cost for the ability to counter advanced 
technology, such as cyber and other weapons designed to counter electronic systems. 
China’s strategy and desire for global prominence should be driving innovation in those 
services as well, especially as they support A2AD. This is especially true with regard to 
cyber, as it provides a relatively cheap yet highly effective method for exploiting the 
technological advantage of an adversary.285 In China’s 2013 Defense White Papers, the 
PRC claims that cyber space is a vital aspect of its A2AD strategy.286 Recent news 
reports also indicate that China has already used this ability to compromise at least two-
dozen of the U.S. military’s programs including the F-35.287 China has also demonstrated 
the ability to disable GPS and data link networks as part of its “electronic dominance” 
strategy.288 
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Another avenue for future work would be to apply the innovations posited by this 
thesis to the frameworks of Cheung and Ross. More specifically, the individual 
innovations could be assessed to see where they fall along the spectrum of innovation. 
This would provide more granularity on whether China’s innovation capability is 
improving and whether these instances show a progression along Cheung’s spectrum of: 
Duplicative Imitation, Creative Imitation, Creative Adaptation, Incremental Innovation, 
Architectural Innovation, Component or Modular Innovation, and Radical Innovation.289   
Using these frameworks may provide a clearer progression from adaptation to 
revolutionary innovation. 
An additional avenue of future research would be to take the principles of 
innovation presented by this thesis and apply them to other nations, one example being 
the United States prior to the 1991 Gulf War, or following WWII when its security 
strategy drastically changed in light of the communist threat. This would provide 
comparisons for how country-level innovation relates to global innovation, especially in 
light of expanding military strategy. This concept could be taken further by examining 
other nations in a similar manner during their rise to global innovation (e.g., Japan pre-
WWII or the Soviet Union during the space race). 
E. SUMMARY 
U.S. Congressional studies on national defense issues consistently discuss the 
fundamental changes imposed by modern technology. They stress that the real concern is 
the potential of systems of systems, instead of directly focusing on individual 
weapons.290 Chapter III on innovation in the PLAN and Chapter IV on innovation in the 
PLAAF showed that, until the 1990s, China put most of its effort into developing new 
platforms and weapons. From 2000–2015, however, the PLA has increasingly produced 
more advanced systems, including ones that are interconnected with an increasing array 
of platforms, weapons, and other systems. This shows that contrary to common analysis, 
China is focused on and capable of developing equipment to fight or deter a modern war. 
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While China has not yet innovated the next great RMA in the eyes of the United 
States or the world, it has succeeded in innovating according to its own counter-RMA. 
Even a third-generation aircraft such as the JH-7 poses a credible threat when equipped 
with fourth- and fifth-generation weapons and systems. This use of innovative technology 
to modernize existing platforms provides an abundance of capable assets. This is counter 
to the U.S. strategy of highly capable, expensive and non-expendable equipment that 
relies on a superior technological advantage to survive.  
As the role of the PLAN and PLAAF has expanded and become central to China’s 
overall strategy, their modernization efforts have increasingly resulted in innovative 
technologies. As evidenced by the DF-21D, YJ-12, PL-12, JY-26, JY-27A, and JY-50 
China is capable of producing global level innovations. 
In order to deal with a modern China, U.S. strategy must shift to account for these 
facts. Planners cannot assume that the U.S. will have the technological and electronic 
advantage in a conflict. China has already demonstrated the ability to neutralize, exploit, 
or destroy key systems such as satellites, GPS, datalink, and radar. At the same time, the 
U.S. has demonstrated that it is increasingly reliant on these advanced technologies to 
operate.  
As Russell’s research predicts, the PLA has been incorporating and developing 
doctrine to match its technological advances. In the words of the DOD’s 2014 Annual 
Report to Congress on the PLA, “Almost all of the PLA’s 2013 exercises focused on 
operating in ‘informationized’ conditions by emphasizing system-of-systems operations, 
a concept that can be viewed as the Chinese corollary to U.S. network-centric warfare. 
This concept requires enhancing systems and weapons with information capabilities and 
linking geographically dispersed forces and capabilities into an integrated system capable 
of unified action.”291 Additionally, the PLA has practiced the use of these new forces to 
counter major threats; for example, in constructing F-117, F-22, F-35, and B-2 mock-ups 
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to test its anti-stealth technology.292 Further evidence suggests that successful ASBM 
tests have been carried out in the Gobi desert that simulate attacks against a U.S. CVN.293 
The 2014 IISS analysis of China military states, “Over the past 15 years, PLA units have 
undergone major structural changes and received significant amounts of new equipment. 
A new doctrine has also been introduced, emphasizing joint operations using all units, 
with both old and new equipment, and integrating new capabilities from all services.”294 
This thesis has found that China is increasingly focused on fielding world-class 
technologies. It has developed equipment that rivals that of the top militaries, and in some 
cases, exceeds them in performance. As China continues to innovate in relation to its past 
capabilities, it is beginning to develop technology that counts as innovation on the global 
scale. Despite these advances, there are still areas where China has not yet been able to 
catch up, primarily in nuclear submarine quieting, jet engine production, and aircraft 
carrier technology. 
In cases where it has not caught up, China has innovated in areas that provide an 
asymmetric advantage. Examples of this are the expansive anti-ship missile programs 
specifically designed to counter U.S. CVNs and stealth-detecting radar designed to defeat 
U.S. fifth-generation aircraft. Furthermore, the combination of its technological 
developments and its security situation both in Asia and with the United States is causing 
the PLA to undergo a period of doctrinal change. Instead of merely focusing on 
developing a limited number of highly capable platforms, weapons, and systems, China is 
following a dual-track of modernization whereby it is developing and fielding advanced 
systems of its own, but is also developing systems that allow its current force structure to 
be much more capable in a future conflict. This is best seen as a direct counter to the U.S. 
doctrine of overwhelming force through technological superiority. 
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China’s strategy, military modernization, and rhetoric all align in what appears to 
be a deterrent doctrine against the United States. In terms of numerical strength, the 
PLAN has already surpassed the U.S. Navy in total number of combatants, and in each 
ship class with the exception of nuclear submarines and aircraft carriers.295 While China 
is working to close this gap, it is simultaneously fielding equipment designed to 
neutralize these extremely expensive and vulnerable platforms.296 China’s modernization 
programs have yielded sufficiently innovative technology that it already possesses the 
ability to deter armed U.S. intervention in Asia due to the destructive potential it can 
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